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ABSTRACT 
This research studies the practical person principle as it was introduced in the case of 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441. 
In its time the Lever Brothers case was a seminal judgment in South Africa’s tax 
jurisprudence and the practical person principle was a decisive criterion for the 
determination of source of income. The primary goal of this research was a critical 
analysis the practical man principle. This involved an analysis of the extent to which 
this principle requires judges to adopt a criterion that is too flexible for legitimate 
judicial decision-making. The extent to which the practical person principle creates a 
clash between a philosophical approach to law and an approach that is based on 
common sense or practicality was also debated. Finally, it was considered whether 
adopting a philosophical approach to determining the source of income could 
overcome the problems associated with the practical approach. 
 
A doctrinal methodology was applied to the documentary data consisting of the South 
African and Australian Income Tax Acts, South African and other case law, historical 
records and the writings of scholars. 
 
From the critical analysis of the practical person principle it was concluded that the 
anthropomorphised form of the principle gives rise to several problems that may be 
overcome by looking to the underlying operation of the principle. Further analysis of 
this operation, however, revealed deeper problems in that the principle undermines 
the doctrine of judicial precedent, legal certainty and the rule of law. Accordingly a 
practical approach to determining the source of income is undesirable and 
unconstitutional. 
 
Further research was conducted into the relative merits of a philosophical approach to 
determining source of income and it was argued that such an approach could provide 
a more desirable solution to determining source of income as well as approaching 
legal problems more generally. 
 
Key Words: 
Lever Brothers, source of income, practical man, practical person, reasonable person, 
two-step framework, judicial certainty, judicial precedent, legality, the rule of law, 
philosophy and practicality. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
[The practical man] would indicate that the obvious thing to 
do would be to ask a lawyer. 
– Schreiner JA, Lever Brothers 
 
I have some difficulty in differentiating the reasoning of the 
practical man from that of the theoretical lawyer. 
– Watermeyer CJ, Lever Brothers 
 
 
1.1. CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
One of the seminal decisions in South African tax jurisprudence is Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd (Lever Brothers).1 This decision of 
the Appellate Division established the precedent for determining the source of income 
and has been cited with approval by a number of South African and international 
courts. Under the source-based system of taxation, which South Africa adopted until 
2001, finding the source of income was a necessary prerequisite for taxation. Despite 
the adoption of section 9 of the Income Tax Act,2 which changes the manner in which 
the source of certain classes of income is determined, the Lever Brothers judgment 
remains instructive for certain matters more than 65 years after it was heard. In 
coming to their decision in the Lever Brothers case, however, the three judges of 
appeal arrived at different conclusions. The basis of their departure appears to be their 
application of the “practical man”3 principle to the facts of the case.  
                                                
1 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441. 
2 South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
3 The term “practical man” is a problematic relic of historical sexism. Although the sexed language of 
this concept would likely be interpreted to include both sexes, this would not always have been the 
case. The fictional case of Fardell v Potts, by AP Herbert (1989) Misleading Cases on the Common 
Law 4ed Buffalo: William S Hein & Co Inc., illustrates the difficulties of not having a “reasonable 
woman” standard. This writer is, however, skeptical that true equality can be reached by placing 
emphasis on “identity characteristics” of men and women (V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: 
Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33). The 
writer is even more concerned that the endurance of sexed language in modern discourse contributes to 
persisting sexist ideologies. One of the ways this is achieved is by constructing the “male” as general 
and references to the “female” as particular. Furthermore, such references contribute to the false 
dichotomy that sex is a binary phenomenon. This paper, therefore, uses the sex-neutral term “practical 
person” and the writer has attempted to avoid the use of sexed pronouns where practicable. A singular 
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The Lever Brothers case concerned the taxation of income received by a non-resident 
company, Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd, situated in England. This income was in 
the form of interest on a loan to the value of approximately £11,000,000 that was 
initially lent to a company situated in the Netherlands. This loan was then ceded, 
along with the obligation to pay interest, to a South African company. The South 
African company, however, never took possession of the shares in an American 
company, which were at all times held in trust by an English company as security for 
the loan. The South African company was nevertheless responsible for the interest on 
the loan, which it duly paid out of dividends on the shares. The question for the 
judges in the Lever Brothers case was whether or not the interest received by Lever 
Brothers and Unilever Ltd in England was from a source within the what was then the 
Union of South Africa and, therefore, subject to tax in South Africa.  
 
In order to come to their decision, all of the judges in Lever Brothers accorded a 
certain weight to the practical person principle in applying it to the facts of the case. 
The genesis of this principle as a tool for determining the source of income was in the 
Australian case of Nathan v FCT (Nathan),4 where Isaacs J held that source is not “a 
legal concept, but something which a practical man would regard as a real source of 
income.” This dictum was then quoted with approval by Lord Atkin in the Privy 
Council decision of Rhodesian Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v COT.5 The effect of Lord 
Atkin’s judgment, according to Lever Brothers, was to create binding authority within 
South Africa and bring the practical person principle into South African law. 
 
1.2. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
It has been argued by a number of authorities6 that it is impossible to lay down precise 
rules for the determination of the source of income. The purpose of the practical 
                                                                                                                                      
“they” has, therefore, been adopted in certain instances. References to other writers have, however, 
been left unchanged. It would be cumbersome to highlight the sexed language used in each quotation, 
but this does not mean that the writer condones the use of such language. 
4 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183 186. 
5 Rhodesian Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v COT 1940 AD 432. 
6 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 454; J Balazs “An Introduction to Australia’s 
Tax System: How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-
b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013); AJ 
Halkyard “Hong Kong Profits Tax: The Source Concept: Part 1” (1990) 20(2) Hong Kong Law Journal 
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person principle is, therefore, to facilitate the attainment of an equitable result by 
allowing judges to decide cases on a case-by-case basis with deference to the views of 
ordinary people.7 In a sense the practical person provides a lens of practicality 
through which the ordinary legal framework must be viewed.8 In line with this, 
Halkyard9 notes that the practical person “allows judges to ignore technical rules 
which would otherwise dictate that source lies in an absurd place.” In a narrow sense, 
the practical person principle justifies the court’s ability to have regard to the 
substance of a matter over its form.10 The broad effect of the practical person 
principle, however, is that it imposes an “extremely flexible”11 criterion on which 
cases must be decided. Kuan12 notes that this flexibility does not give judges adequate 
guidance with the result that “it is possible for the courts to go astray.”  
 
In the Lever Brothers case, the flexibility inherent to the practical person principle 
resulted in a situation where each of the judges was able to take a completely different 
approach to locating the source of the income in question. While judicial discord is 
not necessarily problematic in and of itself, it may be an indication of a deeper trouble 
with the tools used in the judicial decision-making process. The use of the practical 
person principle as a criterion for judgment clearly makes the outcome of cases less 
predictable in advance since the decision is no longer predicated on an application of 
the law but rather on the discretion of the judges. The effect of this, paradoxically, is 
to undermine the very reason for which the practical person principle was introduced 
in the first place: that is, to arrive at decisions that are more consistent with the 
public’s perception of the law. Instead, the application of the practical person 
principle results in cases that are less predictable. The result of this is that legal 
certainty and the principle of judicial precedent are undermined. Since legal certainty 
                                                                                                                                      
232 at 241; LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 517 at 519-520; LH Kuan “Income Tax – Source Principle Refined” (1992) 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 566 at 571. 
7 M Wills “The Income Tax Implications of a Foreign Individual Contracting to do Business in 
Australia, with Particular Reference to Concepts of ‘Residence’ and ‘Source’” (1997) 9(1) Bond Law 
Review 34 at 47; FCT v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525 538. 
8 Kuan 1991 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 520, where it is argued that the legal framework must 
be seen “through the eyes of the practical man.” J Balazs “An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: 
How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-
b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013). 
9 Halkyard 1990 Hong Kong Law Journal 242. 
10 TW Liang “The Source of Interest: Section 10 and Section 12(6) of the Income Tax Act” (1988) 30 
Malaya Law Review 393 at 399. 
11 Kuan 1991 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 520. 
12 Kuan 1991 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 520. 
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is a requirement of the principle of legality and, therefore, the rule of law, the result is 
one that is not only unconscionable but also unconstitutional. This is because it 
violates section 1(c) of the constitution,13 which states that the rule of law is one of 
South Africa’s founding values. 
 
The incorporation of the practical person principle as a tool for judicial decision-
making in South African law, it is argued, has not facilitated legal certainty and 
effective decision-making on the part of judges. Instead, it would appear that the 
flexibility inherent in this construction allows judges to be less rigorous in their 
application of the law than they are required to be. The consequence of this is that the 
practical person becomes a tool that may be easily co-opted as a substitute for judges’ 
personal opinions in the guise of a legitimate application of the law.  
 
Davis AJA in Lever Brothers seems to define the practical person in contrast to the 
philosophical person. Over and above this, it will be shown that the practical person is 
intended to exemplify “common sense” and pragmatism rather than the pedantry 
associated with legal/philosophical reasoning. Russell14 and Chesterton15 on the other 
hand, argue for the merits of philosophical enquiry. This research will demonstrate 
that the failure of the Lever Brothers decision to achieve legal certainty may be 
construed as an indication of the inadequacies of “common sense” reasoning and is 
instead a call to a more rigorous philosophical enquiry. 
 
This research will, therefore, expand the scope of this thesis beyond issues of the 
source of income and will ask questions about the correct approach to judicial 
decision-making and South Africa’s jurisprudence more generally. 
 
1.3.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary goal of this research is to critically analyse the practical person principle. 
This will be achieved principally by evaluating it in the context of the Lever Brothers 
case. More generally, this concept’s reception in a number of foreign jurisdictions as a 
tool for determining the source of income will also be examined. In order to assist this 
                                                
13 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
14 B Russell The Problems of Philosophy (1959). 
15 GK Chesterton The Common Man (1950). 
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analysis, parallels will be drawn between the practical person of taxation 
jurisprudence, and the reasonable person of criminal law16 and the law of delict.  
 
In the process of achieving the primary goal set out above, a number of sub-goals will 
be addressed.  
• First, it will be necessary to evaluate the extent to which the practical person 
principle requires judges to adopt a criterion that is too flexible for legitimate 
judicial decision-making. 
• Second, the practical person principle will be evaluated against its ability to 
promote legal certainty, the principle of judicial precedent and the rule of law. 
• Third, the extent to which the practical person principle creates a clash 
between a philosophical approach to law and an approach that is based on 
common sense or practicality will be debated. 
• Finally, by adopting a philosophical approach to determining the source of 
income, a test that overcomes the problems of legal certainty and inequity 
outlined above will be sought.  
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
An interpretative research approach is adopted for the present research as it seeks to 
understand and describe.17 The research methodology to be applied can be described 
as a doctrinal research methodology. This provides a systematic exposition of the 
rules and approaches governing a particular legal category (in the present case, the 
legal rules relating to the determination of the source of one’s income and the 
application of the practical person principle), analyses the relationships between the 
rules, explains areas of difficulty and is based purely on documentary data.18 
 
 
 
                                                
16 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33.  
17 E Babbie and J Mouton The Practice of Social Research (2009) Oxford University Press Southern 
Africa: Cape Town. 
18 MA McKerchar “Philosophical Paradigms, Inquiry Strategies and Knowledge Claims: Applying the 
Principles of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation” (2008) eJournal of tax Research 1 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/eJTR/2008/1.html (accessed 4 October 2013). 
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This will involve an analysis of various forms of documentary data including:  
• income tax legislation;  
• relevant case law, including cases from South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, where the practical person concept has been used 
and commented upon; 
• historical records, to the extent that it will provide insight into the 
backgrounds of the judges in Lever Brothers and may provide an explanation 
for some of their decisions and/or approaches to this case; and  
• writings of experts in the field to provide the framework against which the 
practical person principle may be critically evaluated.  
 
A doctrinal analysis of the “black letter” law will form the foundation of the analysis 
and will involve the interpretation of relevant case law. Thereafter, a critical approach 
will be undertaken, incorporating the writings of various experts and historical texts. 
This critical approach will provide the substance of the positive argument. 
 
The research is conducted in the form of an extended argument, supported by 
documentary evidence. The validity and reliability of the research and the conclusions 
will be ensured by: 
• adhering to the rules of the statutory interpretation, as established in terms of 
statute and common law; 
• placing greater evidential weight on legislation, case law which creates 
precedent or which is of persuasive value (primary data), and the writings of 
acknowledged experts in the field; 
• discussing opposing viewpoints and concluding, based on a preponderance of 
credible evidence; and 
• the rigour of the arguments. 
 
Since the research required for this paper only necessitates an analysis of 
documentary data, all of which is in the public domain, no ethical considerations 
arise. Interviews will not be conducted; opinions will be considered in their written 
form. 
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It must also be mentioned, further, that the purpose of this paper is to examine and 
critique the Lever Brothers case and the practical person principle. At various points, 
the reasoning and decisions of the judges in Lever Brothers and in other cases have, 
therefore, been subjected to critique. This critique is not intended deride the particular 
judges. It is recognised that judges must do the best they can, given the limited time 
available to them and the strict rules of the judicial decision-making process. In 
writing this paper, such limitations have not arisen. Instead, the writer has had the 
benefit of abundant time and the opportunity to discuss the matter with a number of 
people. Over and above this, the advent of constitutionalism and the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa have provided the writer with 
tools that would not have been available to many of the judges referred to. These tools 
have greatly facilitated this critique and the positive argument presented. 
 
1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
The foundation of this research is the Lever Brothers case which incorporated the 
practical person principle into South African law. A detailed overview and critical 
analysis of this case are, therefore, undertaken in Chapter 2 in order to properly 
contextualise this important judgment. This involves a description of five key aspects 
of the judgment: the facts of the case; the issue before the judges; the legal framework 
used by the judges; the judgments of each of the judges and, finally, a description of 
how the practical person principle was used in the case. This analysis is undertaken 
with a view to properly describing the framework into which the practical person 
principle was crafted. 
 
Against the milieu of the Lever Brothers judgment the practical person principle 
appears as a decisive factor in matters requiring a determination of source of income. 
Chapter 3, therefore, sets out to analyse this principle in greater detail. In this process 
the history of this principle is traced back to its formation in Australia in the early 
1900s, and a brief comparative analysis is undertaken of the use of this principle in 
other jurisdictions, particularly in Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia.  
 
The key advance made in Chapter 3 is a discussion of the purpose for which the 
practical person principle was introduced. In this regard an analysis of the early 
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source of income cases shows that the Legislature intended the source of income to be 
determined practically. This is largely because it was considered impossible to 
construct an ultimate definition of source of income. This problem also spilled over 
into the two-step framework that Watermeyer CJ established in Lever Brothers. A 
flexible tool was, therefore, required in order to facilitate a practical approach to the 
particular facts of each case and prevent the possibility of unjust results. This tool was 
the creation of the practical person principle. This conclusion is evidenced with a 
reference to scholarly writing from Hong Kong and Singapore where their 
frameworks for determining source of income were not developed in parallel with 
their adoption of the practical person principle.  
 
Given the role that the practical person principle is crafted to fulfil, it becomes 
possible to elucidate a number of “characteristics” of this hypothetical person. The 
second half of Chapter 3 is, therefore, devoted to this purpose. In particular it is 
contended that the practical person must be a flexible criterion that facilitates giving 
precedence to the substance of a matter over its form; disregarding technical legal 
rules; aligning the law with public perceptions; and, above all, a practical – rather 
than philosophical – approach to judicial decision-making.  
 
The discussion of the true operation of the practical person principle in Chapter 3 
reveals a number of problematic repercussions. It appears, therefore, that in rectifying 
the problems associated with the source of income inquiry, the practical person 
principle proves to be a “double-edged sword.” Chapter 4, therefore, sets out to 
examine the negative consequences of the practical person principle in greater detail. 
In particular two broad categories of problems are identified: those that arise out of 
the form of the principle, and those that arise out of its substance.  
 
The first category of problems arises out of the way the principle was described in the 
Lever Brothers case. In particular that it is an anthropomorphisation of the underlying 
aspects of the source of income enquiry: practicality and factual-precedence. These 
problems can, consequently, be removed by describing the principle differently. In 
particular, by looking to the true operation of the principle – as a tool to restrain the 
overzealous application of the law – the personification can be removed without 
negating the underlying operation of the principle. In this manner, the problems with 
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the source of income inquiry identified in Chapter 3 continue to be overcome without 
creating the additional problems arising out of the anthropomorphised principle. 
 
The latter category of problems, however, arises out of the substance of the practical 
person principle. These problems are, therefore, independent of the guise that is given 
to the principle. This is because these problems arise out of the approach that is taken 
to determining source of income: that it must be assessed factually and practically. In 
particular two key problems are discussed: that the principle cannot deal with 
complex legal issues and that it offers an unduly flexible criterion for judicial 
decision-making.  
 
The latter part of Chapter 4 is devoted to an exposition of the down-stream 
consequences of these problems. In particular, it is argued that this approach 
undermines key aspects of our justice system including the doctrine of judicial 
precedent; prospective application of the law; legal certainty; legality and the rule of 
law. 
 
The problems with the overall approach discussed in Chapter 4 are shown to be the 
result of the initial decision that determining the source of income should not be 
subject to an ultimate test. It is out of this decision that the problematic practical 
approach was conceived. By questioning this foundational assumption, Chapter 5 sets 
out to evaluate the relative merits of an approach that is predicated on philosophy – 
characterised by impersonal, abstract and universal thought – rather than practicality, 
which is based on concrete notions of common sense and custom. The method used in 
Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v CIR19 is then evaluated against its ability to 
provide a definitive test for determining source of income that is predicated on a 
philosophical evaluation of the legal nature of source of income. Finally this test is 
evaluated against its application to the facts of the Lever Brothers case. It is 
concluded that, by proceeding from a philosophical analysis of the principles of 
source of income, a test can be developed that overcomes the problems that were 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In this way, an ultimate test for determining source of 
income is proposed. 
                                                
19 Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v CIR 1939 AD 487. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 revisits the goals of this thesis and summarises the key conclusions 
drawn, assessing the extent to which these objectives have been achieved. Throughout 
this process certain topics that were beyond the scope of this research are highlighted. 
In some cases these limitations present opportunities for future research; these are 
highlighted where appropriate. 
 
By illustrating the flaws of a solely practical approach to judicial decision-making, 
this thesis argues for a more rigorous philosophical approach to the law.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LEVER BROTHERS CASE 
 
The purpose of all these manoeuvres is not quite clear. 
Probably the substitution… was effected in order to avert 
certain consequences which were foreseen if Holland were 
occupied by the enemy. 
– Watermeyer CJ, Lever Brothers 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The opportunity to make a final delineation on the issue of when tax should be paid in 
South Africa arose in the Lever Brothers case.20 In many respects the court seized this 
opportunity and the resulting judgment became the definitive authority21 in this regard 
until 1998 when amendments to the Income Tax Act22 created specific rules for this 
question. This case is, therefore, rightly regarded as a seminal judgment in South 
African tax jurisprudence and still finds application today. Despite its importance, 
however, closer examination of Lever Brothers reveals certain key principles laid 
down by the court to be deeply problematic.  
 
This chapter will discuss the Lever Brothers judgment as a precursor to an evaluation 
of the practical person principle that will follow in Chapter 3. This discussion will 
involve an analysis of five key aspects of the judgment. First, the facts of the case will 
be set out in order to properly contextualise the judgment. Second, the problem that 
arose in the judgment will be identified and discussed. Third, the framework used by 
the judges will be briefly outlined. Fourth, a short discussion of each of the judges’ 
application of this framework to the facts of the case will be conducted in order to 
illustrate their discordance. Finally, a short description of their differing applications 
of the practical person principle will be undertaken.  
 
                                                
20 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441. 
21  R Thackwell The Contribution Made by Mr Justice EF Watermeyer to South African Tax 
Jurisprudence (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Rhodes University 2010) 75. 
22 Section 25(1)(b) of the South African Income Tax Act 30 of 1998. 
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2.2. FACTS OF LEVER BROTHERS 
The Lever Brothers case arose out of tax assessments for the years 1940 to 1942 in 
which two English companies, Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd (Levers) and 
Associated Enterprises Ltd were assessed on income received within the Union of 
South Africa. The English companies disputed the assessment and took the matter to 
the Special Income Tax Court, which found in their favour.23 The Lever Brothers case 
arose out of an appeal from this decision by the South African Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue.  
 
In setting out the facts of the case, Watermeyer CJ in Lever Brothers notes that the 
parties had agreed to be bound by a decision based only on the facts as they relate to 
Levers.24 This is because Associated Enterprises Ltd, a subsidiary of Levers, was in a 
materially similar position. The outcome of the case would, therefore, settle the 
dispute for both companies.  
 
At the heart of the case were two agreements entered into in Rotterdam, Holland, 
between Levers and Maatschappy voor Internationale Beleggingen N.V (Mavibel) in 
1937 and 1939. Mavibel was a Dutch company with its registered office in 
Rotterdam. These agreements were, as Watermeyer CJ noted euphemistically, 
“somewhat involved.”25 The overall effect of which was a sale of certain assets from 
Levers to Mavibel. Mavibel in return would be liable for £11,000,000, which would 
be repayable before the end of 1961, and interest was payable annually on the amount 
due. Mavibel also agreed to furnish security for the debt by transferring roughly 
£11,800,000 worth of shares to a trustee. The company that would act as trustee was 
The Whitehall Trust Ltd, an English company, which would hold the shares on behalf 
of Mavibel.26  
 
In 1940, a number of new agreements were entered into. These agreements had the 
effect of transferring the rights and obligations of Mavibel, outlined above, to 
Overseas Holdings Pty Ltd (Overseas Holdings), a South African company with its 
                                                
23 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 444. 
24 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 444. 
25 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 445. 
26 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 445. 
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head office in Durban. 27  Subject to some modifications, Overseas Holdings 
essentially stepped into the shoes of Mavibel and between 1940 and 1943 proceeded 
to pay the interest it owed to Levers at their registered office in London.  
 
It is to be noted that part of the move to South Africa involved an agreement with the 
South African Treasury that no interest or capital would be paid out of South African 
funds.28 In accordance with this, all interest payments were made to Levers out of 
dividends received in respect of shares that Overseas Holdings owned in an American 
company.29 At no point did the funds pass through South Africa. 
 
The reason for the substitution was not made clear by the parties; however, 
Watermeyer CJ30 and Schreiner JA31 speculated that this was done “in order to avert 
certain consequences which were foreseen if Holland were occupied by the enemy 
(Germany).”32 From the scheme of the original contractual provisions entered into in 
1937, it would seem that the event of war in Europe was foreseen and certain 
measures put in place in anticipation of this. The move from Holland (shortly before it 
was invaded by Germany) to South Africa was, therefore, consistent with this 
strategy.  
 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue then assessed Levers on the interest it had 
received from Overseas Holdings on the basis that it was earned from a source within 
the Union of South Africa.33  
 
2.3. THE ISSUE 
The question before the court was whether or not the interest income earned by 
Levers was taxable under the South African Income Tax Act (the Act).34 More 
specifically, the issue related to a consideration of whether this income ought to be 
                                                
27 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 461. 
28 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 465. 
29 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 448. 
30 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 448. 
31 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 461. 
32 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 448. 
33 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 448. 
34 South African Income Tax Act 31 of 1941. 
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regarded as being from a source within South Africa.35 At this time, South Africa 
operated under a source based system of taxation.  
 
2.4. THE WATERMEYER CJ FRAMEWORK 
The starting point for Watermeyer CJ in Lever Brothers was the statute that entitled 
the state to collect taxes on income.36 It must be remembered that at this time the 
Union of South Africa was under a system of parliamentary sovereignty. One of the 
effects of this was that judges had little scope to question duly passed acts of 
parliament. This system heavily influenced the dominant approach to statutory 
interpretation, and resulted in a preference of the literalist/intentionalist approach, as 
well as deference to the superior power of parliament. This approach was echoed at 
the beginning of Schreiner JA’s judgment where it is noted that the concern of the 
court was “solely with the application of statute, properly construed; to facts properly 
analysed and assessed.”37  
 
The relevant section of the Act for the Lever Brothers decision was the definition of 
“gross income.” Importantly, the Legislature set out to include in gross income 
amounts earned “from a source which is within the Union or which is deemed to be 
within the Union.”38 The term “source” was, however, not defined in the Act.39 This 
meant that it was left to judicial pronouncements to clarify its meaning. In consulting 
these judgments, Watermeyer CJ confirmed the approach taken in Overseas Trust Co 
Ltd v CIR40 and COT v Dunn & Co41 that “source” refers to the origin of income and 
not its location.42 Watermeyer CJ held further that these and other decisions led to the 
inference that “the source of receipts, received as income, is not the quarter whence 
they come but the originating cause of their being received as income.”43 
 
                                                
35 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 449. 
36 The Income Tax Act 31 of 1941. 
37 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 457.  
38 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 449. 
39 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 457. 
40 Overseas Trust Co Ltd v CIR 1926 AD 444. 
41 COT v Dunn & Co 1918 AD 607.  
42 Overseas Trust Co Ltd v CIR 1926 AD 444 453. 
43 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 450. 
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An important consequence of describing source as the origin of income rather than its 
location is that it allowed Watermeyer CJ to separate these two, often conflated, 
concepts. The effect is what has become lauded as “Watermeyer’s two pronged 
test.”44 Describing it as a “test,” however, does not accurately convey the true 
operation of Watermeyer CJ’s approach. The two questions cannot be asked in the 
alternative, nor are they different methods to be applied to the same question. A 
similar problem arises in Haupt’s description of the approach as having two 
“factors.”45 This implies that the two questions ought to be weighed together to 
contribute to the final outcome. This again is incorrect. The approach which comes 
closest to the mark, therefore, is the description in Silke: South African Income Tax as 
a “problem [that] involves an enquiry into two matters.”46 It is clear from the 
judgment that Watermeyer CJ delineated a stepped approach that requires an answer 
to both questions in the order that they are posed. This is Watermeyer CJ’s two-step 
framework and it was the first meaningful guide to determining source of income in 
South Africa’s tax jurisprudence.  
 
Although a framework with which to evaluate the source of income had been 
established, this was by no means the end of the enquiry. What remained to be done 
was to apply this framework to the case at hand. In this process, Watermeyer CJ cited 
with approval a passage from the Australian case Nathan v FCT (Nathan):47  
 
Source means, not a legal concept, but something which the practical man would 
regard as a real source of income. The ascertaining of the actual source is a practical 
hard matter of fact. 
 
This maxim arose out of an interpretation of the decision in Mitchell (Surveyor of 
Taxes) v Egyptian Hotels Ltd48 where the court had regard to source of income as “a 
question of fact.” The important contribution of the court in Nathan, therefore, was to 
expand this approach considerably. The result was a guiding principle that was 
                                                
44  R Thackwell The Contribution Made by Mr Justice EF Watermeyer to South African Tax 
Jurisprudence (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Rhodes University 2010) 88. 
45 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 32 ed (2013) 37. 
46 L van Schalkwyk “Residence and Source” in M Stiglingh (ed) Silke: South African Income Tax 
(2013) 65.  
47 Nathan v FCT 25 CLR 183 186. 
48 Mitchell (Surveyor of Taxes) v Egyptian Hotels Ltd  [1915] UKHL 2 2, 7. 
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intended to inform all decisions involving questions of source of income. This was the 
practical person principle.  
 
After it was applied in the Nathan decision, the practical person principle was quickly 
accepted by the Privy Council49 and subsequently spread to a number of jurisdictions 
including Hong Kong,50 New Zealand51 and South Africa.52 
 
2.5. THE THREE JUDGMENTS IN LEVER BROTHERS 
2.5.1. WATERMEYER CJ 
Watermeyer CJ began with an application of the legal framework to the facts in Lever 
Brothers by attempting to determine the originating cause of interest income. In this 
regard, a largely legal/philosophical analysis of a debt was undertaken. Watermeyer 
CJ held that, 
 
[a] debt is a legal obligation, something having no corporeal existence; consequently 
it can have no real and actual situation in the material world. Metaphorically, 
however, by legal fiction, it may have a situation in a place, determined by accepted 
legal rules.53 
 
The colloquial expression that a debt is located where the debtor resides was, 
concluded Watermeyer CJ, a metaphor that did not adequately settle the current 
issue.54 By comparing a loan of money to the lease of property, Watermeyer CJ was 
able to hold that the true originating cause of interest income was the provision of 
credit by the lender.55 
 
The next, and more difficult, task was to locate the source of income. In this regard, 
Watermeyer CJ undertook a detailed analysis of a number of cases that had dealt with 
                                                
49 Rhodesian Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v COT 1940 AD 432. 
50 CIR v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [1990] UKPC 42. 
51 CIR v N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken (1954) 10 ATD 435 in J Balazs “An Introduction to 
Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 
http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-
Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013). 
52 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 454. 
53 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 449. 
54 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 456. 
55 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 451. 
 17 
the location of the source of income in various situations.56 This analysis allowed a 
number of relevant factors to be drawn from the totality of the factual matrix in Lever 
Brothers. These factors included the following: that no contract was signed in South 
Africa; no property was situated in South Africa; the sale took place in England; the 
obligations under the contract were performed in England; no business was carried 
out in South Africa; no capital was employed in South Africa; no services were 
rendered in South Africa; and no obligations were to be performed in South Africa. 
From this, Watermeyer CJ concluded that no activities were performed in South 
Africa and, therefore, that the income was not from a source within South Africa.57 
 
In sum, Watermeyer CJ adopted a negative approach, showing that each aspect of the 
transaction could not be attributed to South Africa and that, therefore, the source of 
the income must have been located outside of South Africa. He did not, however, 
conclude that the place where the credit was made available established the location 
of the source. 
 
The essence of Watermeyer CJ’s approach up to this point is most accurately 
described as legalistic in nature. Much emphasis was placed on a correct 
understanding of legal metaphor, as well as correctly understanding the legal rules 
that fictionally situate incorporeals at a certain physical location. As was his custom,58 
Watermeyer CJ also undertook a thorough exploration of the relevant authorities and 
accepted legal rules. 
 
In justifying this conclusion, however, Watermeyer CJ examined an additional line of 
reasoning. Perhaps recognising the potential discordance between his legalistic 
reasoning and the opinion of the practical person, Watermeyer CJ stated that he had 
“some difficulty in differentiating the reasoning of the practical man from that of the 
theoretical lawyer for this purpose.”59 His conclusion, therefore, held not only in law 
but also, conveniently, in practical reality. 
 
                                                
56 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 451-455. 
57 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 456. 
58  R Thackwell The Contribution Made by Mr Justice EF Watermeyer to South African Tax 
Jurisprudence (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Rhodes University 2010). 
59 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 457. 
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2.5.2. SCHREINER JA 
The approach taken by Schreiner JA in Lever Brothers was similar to Watermeyer 
CJ’s in that it was primarily legalistic in nature. Schreiner JA started by describing 
three types of income: income from personal activities, income from the use of one’s 
property, and income from a combination of the two. Applying this to the case at 
hand, Schreiner JA made three important findings. First, that the taxpayer did not earn 
the income in question because of the activities it conducted but simply from the loan 
of property.60 Second, that the place where the contract was signed, as well as the 
place where the interest was due, were irrelevant for the present enquiry.61 Third, that 
the interest on a loan was analogous to that of the fruits of property. Therefore, the 
interest income was derived from the loan amount and must, accordingly, be located 
with this amount.62 In other words, Schreiner JA held that the originating cause of the 
income was the loan and that the loan is correctly located with the debtor.  
 
Schreiner JA proceeded to support this conclusion with reference to English, Scottish 
and Australian Bank Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue63 in which it was held 
that a debt is located where the debtor resides.  
 
In Lever Brothers, Overseas Holdings acquired the rights and obligations of Mavibel 
with the consent of Levers and became the debtor. The location of the loan amount 
must, therefore, be the residence of Overseas Holdings. Since Overseas Holdings was 
incorporated in South Africa, with the majority of its directors resident in South 
Africa and with it conducting its business meetings out of its head office in South 
Africa, it was accordingly located in South Africa.64 The source of the interest income 
was, therefore, in South Africa. 
 
In coming to this decision Schreiner JA made a number of references to the views of 
the “practical business man.”65 The difficulty Schreiner JA had in reconciling the 
reasoning set out above with the views of the practical person centred on the 
                                                
60 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 458. 
61 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 460. 
62 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 460. 
63 English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1932 AC 238 246 in 
CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 462. 
64 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 461. 
65 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 462. 
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artificiality of having to locate a debt. It was noted that this had to be done by way of 
legal fiction, which was, therefore, outside of the grasp of the practical person.66 
Schreiner JA, however, held that the practical person would realise, once the situation 
was explained to them, that locating an incorporeal in space is necessary. 67 
Presumably their lawyer would explain this.68  
 
Despite the above, Schreiner JA was confident that the practical person,  
 
would be surprised if he were informed that the source of interest on a longterm loan 
was the contract, made possibly decades ago, and not the loan debt itself.69 
 
Schreiner JA did, however, add the caveat that a practical person would probably do 
the obvious thing, which is to ask a lawyer.70  
 
Overall, therefore, the approach of Schreiner JA in applying the law to the facts was 
similar to that of Watermayer CJ in three material respects. First, they both proceeded 
from a legalistic argument to come to a preliminary conclusion. Second, they both 
used the concept of the practical person (albeit different incantations of it) to support 
their legal findings. Third, where they did not feel comfortable that the findings of the 
practical person would align with their own legally derived conclusions, they simply 
equated the two. Watermeyer CJ did this expressly while Schreiner JA did this 
impliedly, suggesting that the practical person would defer to legal advice.  
 
2.5.3. DAVIS AJA 
The conclusion Davis AJA reached was in line with Watermeyer CJ’s; however, they 
differed radically in their reasoning. Of the three judges, Davis AJA was the only one 
that proceeded strictly from the position of the practical person and not with a legal 
foundation. Davis AJA framed the conception of the practical person as a “test” that 
the court was “bound to adopt.”71  
 
                                                
66 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 463. 
67 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 462. 
68 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464. 
69 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 463. 
70 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464. 
71 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464. 
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Davis AJA’s conclusion was, accordingly, based on two observations of what the 
practical person would consider correct in the present case. First, was that the 
practical person would conclude that the source of the income was either from the 
dividends in America or the granting of credit in England.72 Deciding between these 
two locations would, however, be difficult for the practical person.  
 
Second, that the practical person would be unable to find the source of the income to 
be in the Union since there had been an express agreement that no capital or interest 
from South African funds would leave South Africa. Therefore, since this provision 
had been complied with, it could not be said that South Africa was the source of the 
income.73 
 
2.6. APPLICATION OF THE PRACTICAL PERSON PRINCIPLE 
The most striking feature of the judgments set out above is that they were all 
manifestly different. The primary distinction between all of the judgments was their 
interpretation and application of the practical person. Accordingly, while Watermeyer 
CJ and Davis AJA reached the same conclusion on the outcome of the case (giving 
them the majority), they did this with different reasons. The essence of the judges’ 
discordance can be summed up as follows: Watermeyer CJ held that the practical 
person would see that the common description of a loan being located where the 
debtor resides is metaphorical. Consequently the necessary process of reasoning, not 
dissimilar from that of the “theoretical lawyer,” 74 would then be taken to come to the 
conclusion that the true source of interest income was the granting of credit and, 
accordingly, not located in South Africa.  
 
Schreiner JA, however, held that the practical person would have difficulty with the 
notion that an incorporeal must be located in space but that this would be resolved 
once the matter was properly explained and the person was assured that the 
Legislature required this.75 From this, the practical person would probably think that 
the source of interest was the debt and accordingly located with the debtor. This was 
                                                
72 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464. 
73 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 465. 
74 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 457. 
75 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 462-463. 
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in line with the legal reasoning Schreiner JA had already set out. Schreiner JA’s final 
comment was that the practical person would probably indicate, when realising the 
complexity of this unusual transaction, that a lawyer should be consulted. 
 
The practical person for Davis AJA was also a different creature altogether. This 
practical person would have put great weight on the agreement between Overseas 
Holdings and the Treasury. Given that both parties adhered to this agreement, and that 
no income or capital flowed from South Africa, the interest, therefore, cannot have 
been from a South African source.  
 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
The facts of the Lever Brothers case provided an unusually difficult challenge for the 
task of locating the source of income. The complexity of the situation was illustrated 
in both Watermeyer CJ’s account of the facts of the case as well as the difficulty each 
of the judges had in placing the income in question. The case, therefore, involved an 
exploration of a number of different factors, many of which required an involved 
consideration of legal metaphor and fiction as well as the nature of an incorporeal 
debt. The unusual transactions entered into between Levers, Mavibel, The Whitehall 
Trust Ltd and Overseas Holdings provided fertile ground for a final delineation of the 
nature of source of income.  
 
In many respects, the judges grasped this opportunity and the Lever Brothers decision 
became a seminal judgment in South Africa’s tax jurisprudence. Through the creation 
of the two-step framework and the incorporation of the practical person into South 
Africa’s law, the Lever Brothers case, and Watermeyer CJ’s judgment in particular, 
became the ultimate authority for determining source of income.76 
 
Further analysis of the Lever Brothers decision, however, reveals tensions between 
the three judgments. These tensions arose out of three different interpretations of the 
practical person principle and resulted in manifestly different approaches to the case. 
                                                
76 For cases referring to Lever Brothers, see for example: CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A); CIR v 
Black 1957 (3) SA 536 (A); COT v British United Shoe Machinery (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1964 (3) SA 193 
(FC); COT v R 1966 (2) SA 342 (RA); Tuck v CIR 1988 (3) SA 819 (A); Essential Sterolin Products 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR 1993 (4) SA 859 (A). 
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While Watermeyer CJ and Davis AJA agreed that the source of income was not 
located in the Union, giving them the majority, they did this for different reasons. 
Schreiner JA, on the other hand, came to a different conclusion altogether. Although 
judicial discord is not necessarily problematic in and of itself, it may be an indication 
of deeper trouble with the tools used in the judicial decision-making process. The use 
of the practical person principle as a criterion for judgment, and the apparent “source” 
of the judges’ divergence will, therefore, be evaluated in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PRACTICAL PERSON 
 
For the person whom Lord Atkin had in mind was the 
practical man and not the legal theorist who, by resolutely 
shutting his eyes to all the facts, could prove that black was 
white. 
– Davis AJA, Lever Brothers 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Lever Brothers decision had the effect of bringing the practical person principle 
into South African law. Although this is not expressly stated in the judgment, the 
reasoning set out in Chapter 2 illustrates that this is clearly the case. Davis AJA was, 
accordingly, correct to state that the court was “bound to adopt the [practical person] 
test.”77 The Lever Brothers case can, therefore, be seen as a watershed decision for 
South Africa’s tax jurisprudence, requiring that all subsequent inquiries into source of 
income apply the practical person principle.  
 
This chapter will examine the inner workings of the practical person principle in 
greater detail. Accordingly, it will lay the foundation for Chapter 4 in which certain 
aspects of its operation will be critically examined. In order to properly understand 
the nature and operation of the practical person principle, it will be necessary to 
discuss two preliminary, and related, topics: first, the purpose for which the practical 
person principle was developed; second, a description of the practical person will be 
delineated in order to outline a broad definition of it. The discussion of these two 
topics will facilitate a greater understanding of the principle and will, therefore, 
underpin an exposition of the true nature of the practical person principle. 
 
 
 
                                                
77 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464. 
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The goal of this chapter can, therefore, be summed up in the following passage by 
Chesterton: 
 
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain 
and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There 
exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, 
a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily 
up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more 
intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I 
certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come 
back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.78 
 
The intent of this approach is to ward off unconsidered attacks at laws or institutions. 
It, therefore, requires that before a law or institution is removed, the purpose for 
which it was established must be thoroughly understood. This chapter will discuss the 
reason for the practical person principle before Chapter 4 attempts to “clear it away.” 
 
3.2. THE PURPOSE OF THE PRACTICAL PERSON 
In the Nathan decision, it was made clear that the practical person principle arises out 
of a proper interpretation of Australian income tax legislation.79 Specifically, it was 
stated that “[t]he Legislature in using the word ‘source’ meant, not a legal concept, 
but something which a practical man would regard as a real source of income.”80 
Beyond this, however, primary sources of law do not provide much guidance on the 
operation of the practical person principle. In examining this principle, it is reasoned 
that the purpose for which it was introduced may facilitate a greater understanding 
thereof.  
 
To borrow from the purposive approach to statutory interpretation,81 the mischief rule 
may be used as a tool for examining the motivation behind the creation of the 
practical person principle.82 The mischief rule operates by investigating the problem/s 
that the enactment was introduced to address as a method for understanding its 
                                                
78 GK Chesterton The Thing (1930) 15. 
79 Section 18 of the South African Income Tax Assessment Act 34 of 1915. 
80 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183 186. 
81 It must be noted that, although the practical person principle arises out of statute, it is not in itself a 
statutory enactment. It is, therefore, not necessary to make use of the tools of statutory interpretation. 
Accordingly, this paper uses these tools out of convenience only.  
82 L du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 248. 
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purpose.83 For the present inquiry it may be used in a similar manner to find the 
purpose of the of the practical person principle. In this regard, an analysis of a number 
of texts that discuss the use of the practical person principle reveals two broad 
problems that this principle has been used to overcome. These will be discussed in 
turn below.  
 
3.2.1. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A DEFINITIVE SOURCE OF INCOME 
TEST 
The first problem is that it is considered, by a number of authorities,84 to be 
impossible to lay down precise rules for the determination of source of income. In the 
first instance this position is supported by a number of cases. In Lever Brothers, it is 
noted that that Lord Atkin, in Rhodesia Metals, decided not to create a universal test 
that would operate in all source of income cases.85 Following this, Watermeyer CJ 
commented that this would “probably [be] an impossible task.”86 Support for this 
conclusion can be found in CIR v Hang Seng Bank Ltd (Hang Seng Bank)87 where the 
Privy Council held that, “[i]t is impossible to lay down precise rules by which… 
[source of income] is to be determined.” 
 
In South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal in FNB v CIR,88 has recently confirmed 
this position, holding that Watermeyer CJ’s evaluation of the totality of the facts in 
the Lever Brothers case would have been unnecessary89 had a universal rule for the 
treatment of interest income been intended. Instead, if a universal rule, or test, were 
possible, it would have only been required that Watermeyer CJ ascertain the nature of 
the income in question and then apply the specific rule applicable to that form of 
income. This approach was clearly not undertaken. 
                                                
83 L du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 96. 
84 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 454; J Balazs 
“An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 
http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-
Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013); AJ Halkyard “Hong Kong Profits Tax: The Source 
Concept: Part 1” (1990) 20(2) Hong Kong Law Journal 232 at 242; LH Kuan “Determining Sources of 
Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 517 at 519-520; LH 
Kuan “Income Tax – Source Principle Refined” (1992) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 566 at 568 
and 571. 
85 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 454. 
86 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 454. 
87 CIR v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [1990] UKPC 42. 
88 FNB v CIR 2002 (3) SA 375 (SCA) para 18. 
89 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 455-456. 
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These cases make it clear that the weight of judicial authority is in favour of the 
position that a single test for the determination of source of income cannot be 
developed.  
 
In the second instance, the cases of CIR v Epstein,90 Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v FCT 
91 and Nathan92 conclude that it was the intention of the Legislature to avoid defining 
source of income too narrowly and instead deliberately left the term undefined. In this 
regard, the court in CIR v Epstein93 held that the Legislature 
 
was probably aware of the difficulty in defining the phrase ‘source within the Union’ 
[and, therefore,] gave no definition. Consequently it is for the Courts to decide on the 
particular facts of each case whether ‘gross income’ has or has not been received 
from a source within the Union (emphasis added). 
 
In the Australian case of Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v FCT,94 it was similarly held that 
the word “source,” as used in their Australian tax legislation,95 “has no precise or 
technical reference.” Furthermore, the Nathan decision96 made it clear that the 
Legislature meant to use the word “source” as a practical concept, and not a legal 
concept from which precise rules would be developed.  
 
This broad approach to the term “source of income” by the Legislature, in both South 
Africa and Australia, has clearly been an important factor that led the courts to the 
conclusion that a universal test for source of income cannot be developed. It would 
seem that this conclusion was anticipated by the Legislature and, from the 
pronouncements above, that the Legislature never intended that a universal test for 
source of income be developed. It is, therefore, submitted that it was the very 
intention of the Legislature that a broad case-by-case approach to determining source 
of income be adopted by the courts. It may be noted that, given the prevailing system 
of parliamentary sovereignty at this time, the intention of the Legislature would have 
been a vital consideration of the courts.  
                                                
90 CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A) 698C-D. 
91 Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v FCT 88 ATC 4886. 
92 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183 186. 
93 CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A) 698C-D. 
94 Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v FCT 88 ATC 4886 4897. 
95 Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 34 of 1915. 
96 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183 186. 
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Returning to the Lever Brothers decision, support for the above contentions can be 
garnered from the fact that it clearly would have been untenable for Watermeyer CJ’s 
judgment to become a final pronouncement on the source of interest income in 
general. This is because it would have meant that the proceeds from all loans to South 
African companies from outside of the Union would have to be regarded as from a 
source outside the Union. It is contended that this would be an absurd proposition. 
Instead, Watermeyer CJ himself noted that whether or not the company is carrying on 
business activities within the Union was of relevance. 97  He, therefore, clearly 
envisioned a situation in which, despite the loan being from a foreign country, the 
interest would have been taxed in South Africa. An example of this may be where 
credit is granted in order to fund business activities in South Africa. It is contended 
that such a situation would have likely led Watermeyer CJ to the conclusion that the 
interest income was from a source within the Union.  
 
Despite the conclusion that a general rule for determining the source of income is 
impossible to create, a number of “guidelines” have evolved to deal with certain 
recurring issues. For example, regarding income from business operations, CIR v 
Epstein98 applied the “activities test.” Alternatively, in the case of employment 
income, the Special Tax Court has emphasised the importance of considering where 
the services were rendered.99 For rental income from fixed property, the criterion that 
is usually decisive is the location of the property that is being leased.100  The 
recognition of these guidelines gives rise to the second problem that the practical 
person principle was introduced to solve. That is the problem of arranging these 
guidelines into a hierarchy. 
 
3.2.2. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ULTIMATE HIERARCHY OF 
FACTORS 
The problem of hierarchy, as may already be apparent from the analysis above, is an 
extension of the inherent problems with determining source of income in general: that 
                                                
97 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 456. 
98 CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A).  
99 L van Schalkwyk “Residence and Source” in M Stiglingh (ed) Silke: South African Income Tax 
(2013) 66. 
100 L van Schalkwyk “Residence and Source” in M Stiglingh (ed) Silke: South African Income Tax 
(2013) 67.  
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is, that it is impossible to lay down a precise test for its determination. In this way, the 
problem of hierarchy is not distinct from the inability to create a general test. For the 
sake of clarity, however, this problem will be evaluated separately. This analysis, 
therefore, provides a practical illustration of the problem outlined above by evaluating 
the frameworks that have been developed in South Africa and Hong Kong for the 
determination of source of income. This practical analysis will, furthermore, 
contribute to the understanding of both the source framework described in Chapter 2, 
and, importantly, the nature of the impossibility of a definitive test for determining 
source of income discussed in Section 3.2.1. 
 
One of the key advances of the Lever Brothers judgment was the creation of a two-
step framework according to which matters of source may be evaluated. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, this approach separates issues regarding source of income into two 
ostensibly factual questions: what is the originating cause of the income and where is 
it located. Although this two-step framework has been recognised101 as the ultimate 
mechanism for the determination of source of income, under closer examination 
difficulties, which are not easily resolved, become apparent. These difficulties, it is 
suggested, have not become apparent in South African jurisprudence since they arose 
at the same time as the principle which provides their cure: the practical person. It is, 
therefore, useful to examine jurisprudence and commentary from Hong Kong where 
the development of their framework for determining source of income (the basic 
source principle) was not unequivocally in line with their adoption of the practical 
person principle.102 This examination will reveal the second problem that the practical 
person principle operates to resolve.  
 
 
                                                
101  R Thackwell The Contribution Made by Mr Justice EF Watermeyer to South African Tax 
Jurisprudence (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Rhodes University 2010); L van Schalkwyk “Residence 
and Source” in M Stiglingh (ed) Silke: South African Income Tax (2013) 65; P Haupt Notes on South 
African Income Tax 32 ed (2013) 37.  
102 The difference between the South African approach and that in Hong Kong, is that in South Africa 
the two-step test arose together with the practical person principle. In the Hang Seng Bank [1990] 
UKPC 42 case it was never explicitly stated that the practical person principle was consistent with the 
Basic Source Principle. After CIR v HK-TVB International Ltd [1992] UKPC 21, there was even less 
certainty as to whether or not the practical person principle ought to play a role in the determination of 
source of income. Kuan argues that the approach of the judge in TVBI left no room for the practical 
person principle. (LH Kuan “Income Tax – Source Principle Refined” (1992) Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 566 at 577). 
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In Hong Kong, a basic framework against which issues of source may be examined 
was developed in two key cases: the Hang Seng Bank103 case, and in CIR v HK-TVB 
International Ltd (TVBI).104 In the Hang Seng Bank case, the Privy Council held that 
the broad guiding principle is to examine “what the taxpayer has done to earn the 
profits in question.” 105  This approach, it is argued, is not dissimilar from the 
“activities test” articulated in CIR v Epstein106 where it was held that “in taxing the 
respondent the Legislature looks at his activities and ascertains whether those 
activities were exercised within the Union.”  
 
This approach, termed the “Basic Source Principle,” was quickly expanded upon in 
the subsequent TVBI107 case, where it was held that “[t]he proper approach is to 
ascertain what were the operations which produced the relevant profits and where 
those operations took place” (emphasis added). This approach is strikingly similar to 
the two-step framework articulated by Watermeyer CJ in Lever Brothers. The TVBI 
approach is, however, nothing more than a nuanced version of the Basic Source 
Principle.108 It is clear that the question of the originating cause of the income, 
Watermeyer CJ’s first step, is analogous to the activity that gives rise to the 
income.109 The second step of the test, that of locating the originating cause, while 
explicit in Watermeyer CJ’s and TVBI’s formulations, is nevertheless implied in the 
Basic Source Principle. This is because it is necessary that the ultimate goal of any 
approach to finding source of income is locating that income. The Basic Source 
Principle, articulated in Hang Seng Bank and TVBI is, therefore, equivalent to the 
two-step framework established in Lever Brothers. 110 This similarity will allow 
conclusions drawn from the Basic Source Principle to be applied to the two-step 
framework. 
                                                
103 Hang Seng Bank [1990] UKPC 42. 
104 CIR v HK-TVB International Ltd [1992] UKPC 21. 
105 Hang Seng Bank [1990] UKPC 42 51. 
106 CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A) 699C. 
107 CIR v HK-TVB International Ltd [1992] UKPC 21 29. 
108 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517 at 521. 
109 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517 at 521. 
110 It may be noted that there are subtle differences between these two approaches: for example, the 
TVBI approach uses the term “operations” which has been criticised as being unduly vague and, 
therefore, offering little guidance, see LH Kuan “Income Tax – Source Principle Refined” (1992) 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 566 at 570. For the present purposes, however, such dissimilarities 
do not compromise the effectiveness of the analogy.  
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In analysing the Basic Source Principle, Kuan111 identifies two problems that arise out 
of the Hang Seng Bank case. The first of these problems is that the Basic Source 
Principle does not provide guidance for determining the originating cause of income 
in cases where there are multiple undertakings by the taxpayer. For example, where a 
person owns fixed property in one country but spends a significant amount of energy 
abroad soliciting foreign tenants for that property. It is unclear which of these factors, 
the location of the property, or the work done to secure its occupation, ought to be 
seen as the originating source of the rental income. The Basic Source Principle does 
not create a hierarchy of factors in this regard and, therefore, is unequipped to deal 
with such situations.112  
 
The second problem is that the Basic Source Principle does not clarify where the 
activities that give rise to the income in question take place.113 It was this question 
that was in issue in the Lever Brothers case.114 While it was accepted by all of the 
judges that the originating cause of the income was the granting of credit, the issue 
that remained was where such a cause ought to be located. The two-step framework 
does not provide clarity in this regard. Watermeyer CJ noted, echoing the problem 
outlined above, that he was not aware of any governing consideration for such a 
determination.115 Instead, there will be in all cases a number of factors that must be 
weighed in order to come to a conclusion on the correct location of the income in 
question.  
 
These two problems are essentially two sides of the same coin. That is, that the Basic 
Source Principle and the two-step framework provide useful guidelines for the 
manner in which source cases may be approached; however, they are not 
comprehensive tools for the determination of source of income in all cases. These 
approaches may, therefore, be seen as useful frameworks to direct a judge’s analysis, 
but cannot be decisive on their own. It is, accordingly, inaccurate to describe the two-
                                                
111 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517; LH Kuan “Income Tax – Source Principle Refined” (1992) Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 566.  
112 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517 at 521. 
113 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517 at 522. 
114 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 451. 
115 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 451. 
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step framework as a “test” as has been done by a number of authorities.116  
 
These problems, however, do not necessarily arise in all cases.117 It is only in difficult 
cases, where there are a number of factors to be considered, that these frameworks 
break down. In such cases, the guidelines provided by these frameworks are not 
sufficient on their own to provide a definitive answer to the question of source of 
income. This conclusion means that these frameworks are limited in their ability to 
locate source of income on their own.  
 
The result of this analysis provides an important insight into the operation of the 
source of income inquiry. The recognition that these frameworks are not judicial tests, 
but are instead a kind of scaffolding, strikes at the heart of this issue. This is because, 
as held in both Lever Brothers118 and TVBI,119 the creation of an ultimate hierarchy of 
factors to overcome the limitations of these approaches is impossible. The reasoning 
given in these judgments is that the creation of such a hierarchy would give 
inadequate credence to the factual differences between cases and, therefore, would 
lead to unjust results. In other words, it was held that such a development would lead 
to the situation in which a strict application of the law would not have the requisite 
flexibility to adequately accommodate significant factual differences between cases.  
 
It is worth noting again that this conclusion is supported in the case of FNB v CIR120 
where it was held that Watermeyer CJ in Lever Brothers did not intend to create a 
general rule for the treatment of interest income. Instead, this evaluation of the totality 
of the facts suggests that such a rule would not be appropriate.  
 
This approach is, therefore, consistent with the reasoning in Section 3.2.1 above, that 
the creation of a universal test for determining source of income is impossible. This is 
because, if it were possible to create a hierarchy of factors for determining both the 
                                                
116 Davis AJA in CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464; R Thackwell The 
Contribution Made by Mr Justice EF Watermeyer to South African Tax Jurisprudence (Unpublished 
Masters Thesis, Rhodes University 2010). 
117 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517 at 522. 
118 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 451. 
119 CIR v HK-TVB International Ltd [1992] UKPC 21. 
120 FNB v CIR 2002 (3) SA 357 (SCA) para 18. 
 32 
origin and location of income, the result would be the development a comprehensive 
test for the determination of source of income. This would accordingly conflict with 
the intention of the Legislature and, from the recent analysis in Section 3.2.2, create a 
set of rules that would be unduly rigid.  
 
The effect of this is that, while the framework within which each case ought to be 
decided remains constant, there can be no universal test that may be applied in all 
cases to determine the source of income. Even when ostensibly similar cases arise, 
such as the same type of income, there may be subtle factual differences that require 
different outcomes to be reached. 
 
3.2.3. THE SOLUTION: THE ADOPTION OF THE PRACTICAL PERSON 
From the discussion above, it is clear that an assessment of source of income presents 
a number of challenges. Firstly, the Legislature did not provide a definition for the 
term “source of income.” Secondly, it was concluded that such a definition is 
impossible and that there can be no universal test for determining the source of 
income. Thirdly, the result of this was the creation of a framework for the 
determination of source of income, the intention of which was to provide some 
guidance to judges investigating source of income. Fourthly, this framework was not 
without difficulty, as it did not create an ultimate hierarchy of factors that would 
provide a conclusive test for the determination of source of income. Finally, the issue 
of hierarchy presents a more fundamental problem in that it was recognised that such 
a hierarchy would lead to an unjustly rigid application of the law in cases where 
factual differences required flexibility.  
 
What was required, therefore, was a tool that would account for the need to ensure 
flexibility in all cases while at the same time fitting into the two-step framework, 
without compromising the Legislature’s intention that a determination of source of 
income should not be subject to a universal test. The tool that was introduced to 
resolve all of these problems was the practical person principle.  
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3.3. DEFINING THE PRACTICAL PERSON 
In South Africa, these problems went unnoticed, it is contended, largely because the 
development of the approach to questions of source of income included the use of the 
practical person principle as a tool to mediate them. It is this comprehensive approach 
that made the Lever Brothers decision a landmark case. Only by looking to other 
jurisdictions, where the practical person principle was not similarly accepted, do the 
above problems appear. What the Lever Brothers decision failed to do, however, was 
to offer a clear description of what is meant by the “practical person.” This section, 
therefore, sets out to briefly define this concept as an important stepping-stone to the 
discussion of the operation of the practical person principle that follows.  
 
The most notable description of the practical person in Lever Brothers comes from 
Davis AJA who states that 
 
the person whom Lord Atkin had in mind was the practical man and not the legal 
theorist who, by resolutely shutting his eyes to all the facts, could prove that black 
was white (emphasis added).121 
 
From this description it is clear that the practical person is defined in contrast to the 
legal theorist. Support for this juxtaposition can be found in the Nathan decision 
where it was held that the source enquiry should be “not a legal concept, but 
something which the practical man would regard as a real source of income.”122 
Again, the practical person is intended to facilitate reasoning that is not legalistic.  
 
The Nathan case continues to state that the source enquiry must be “a practical hard 
matter of fact.”123 This statement gives content to the role that the practical person is 
intended to fulfill. Specifically it indicates that the practical person is a mechanism 
that has two key functions. This mechanism will be referred to as the “Nathan 
maxim.” 
 
The first of these functions is to ensure that the enquiry is practical. Practicality, 
although not defined in the case, is submitted to be concerned with the actual or real 
                                                
121 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 465. 
122 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183 186. 
123 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183. 
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state of affairs and not, as Davis AJA indicates above, theoretical or philosophical 
ponderings. The practical person is, therefore, exemplified by common sense rather 
than the “hair splitting” associated with technical legal rules.124 
 
In short, the practical person is pragmatic. The use of the practical person principle is, 
therefore, designed to ensure that judges adopt the same pragmatism in their approach 
to issues of source of income. They must, in other words, determine source of income 
as the hypothetical practical person would. 
 
The second function of the practical person principle is to place emphasis on the 
particular facts of each case. Although this is a necessary aspect of judicial decision-
making, it is argued that the practical person principle requires that judicial precedent 
should be accorded less importance than would ordinarily be the case. This is in order 
to make room for a kind of factual-precedence. The practical person principle is, 
therefore, a tool that is used to ensure a case-by-case treatment of matters regarding 
source of income.  
 
The role of the practical person can, therefore, be seen as an anthropomorphisation of 
the underlying judicial principles of the Nathan maxim. In this way, it is similar to the 
concept of the reasonable person from criminal law125 and the law of delict, which is 
also personified.  
 
The reasonable person, it is reasoned, was introduced to fulfil a similar role to that of 
the practical person. This is demonstrated in the case of R v Smith (Morgan)126 where 
it was held that 
 
[T]he concept of the ‘reasonable man’ has never been more than a way of explaining 
the law to a jury; an anthropomorphic image to convey to them, with a suitable 
degree of vividness, the legal principle that… people must conform to an objective 
standard of behaviour that society is entitled to expect (emphasis added). 
 
                                                
124 B Russell The Problems of Philosophy (1959); AJ Halkyard “Hong Kong Profits Tax: The Source 
Concept: Part 1” (1990) 20(2) Hong Kong Law Journal 232 at 242. 
125 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 34. 
126 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146 172 E - F. 
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Nourse, however, argues that anthropomorphising the reasonable person “does more 
to obscure than reveal.”127 In this regard she contends that the image conveyed by the 
anthropomorphised depiction brings with it more than just the legal principles behind 
it. In other words, it allows judges to introduce their own conceptions of the 
characteristics of the practical person into the judicial decision-making process.  
There is, furthermore, evidence of this happening in Lever Brothers. Firstly, Schreiner 
JA held that the person, whose hypothetical views must be considered, is the 
“practical business man.”128 This suggests someone with a degree of education as well 
as business acumen, perhaps even a professional of some kind. Clearly the views of 
the practical businessperson are different to those of the practical person and, 
therefore, Schreiner JA’s consideration ought to change accordingly.  
 
Secondly, both Watermeyer CJ129 and Schreiner JA130 indicated that the views of the 
practical person would, in effect, align with the views of a lawyer. In this regard they 
seem to be imputing abilities on the practical person that Davis AJA does not. The 
consequence of this is that the reasoning used by the judges will necessarily differ 
since they are deferring to different conceptions of the practical person. The 
anthropomorphisation of the practical person, therefore, allows judges to bring their 
own notions of the concept into the judgment and, essentially, allows the case to be 
judged by differing standards.  
  
The practical person, in conclusion, is a tool that must be used to ensure that source of 
income is correctly located. In this regard it is an anthropomorphisation of two 
underlying principles: the importance of practicality and an emphasis on the specific 
facts of the case. The sum of these, as held by Davis AJA, is to create an approach 
that is practical and not philosophical in nature. As with all anthropomorphisations, 
however, it is shown that the image of the practical person creates the leeway to 
introduce further considerations into the judicial decision-making process. This is 
evident from the discordance illustrated between the judges in Lever Brothers. The 
practical person principle is, therefore, no more than a vague approximation of the 
                                                
127 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
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128 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 463. 
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legal principles at the heart of the source enquiry. This vagueness, furthermore, 
permits more than just these principles forming part of the judicial making process. 
 
3.4. THE OPERATION OF THE PRACTICAL PERSON PRINCIPLE 
In the Nathan decision it was held that the practical person principle should be used to 
achieve two things.131 First, it must give adequate credence to the factual matrix of 
each case and, second, it should be used to arrive at conclusions practically and not 
formalistically. These legal principles, embodied in the practical person principle, 
operate to overcome the problems with the source enquiry in general as well as the 
problems with the two-step framework in particular. This is achieved through the 
interplay between six key characteristics of the practical person principle. Each of 
these aspects will be discussed in turn below. 
 
3.4.1. THE PRACTICAL PERSON AS AN ATTITUDE OF MIND 
The first aspect of the operation of the practical person principle is that the two 
principles embodied in the Nathan maxim provide a mechanism that informs the 
application of Watermeyer CJ’s two-step framework in Lever Brothers. In this regard, 
Balazs comments that 
 
Practical reality is not a test so much as an attitude of mind in which the Court should 
approach the task of judgment. Reality, like beauty, is often in the eye of the 
beholder” (emphasis added).132 
 
In a sense the practical person principle, therefore, provides a lens of practicality 
through which the ordinary legal framework must be viewed.133  
 
In sum, this “lens of practicality” enables the comprehensive approach of the two-step 
framework informed by the Nathan maxim, and is the crux of Watermeyer CJ’s 
                                                
131 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183. 
132 Nathan v FCT (1918) 25 CLR 183. 
133 Kuan 1991 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 520, where it is argued that the legal framework 
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contribution in Lever Brothers (his ratio decidendi). It has become the authoritative 
model for determining source of income in South Africa and has been referred to with 
approval on numerous occasions.134 The effect of this comprehensive approach is to 
prescribe a method for determining the source of income that gives judges the 
structure of the two-step framework, while at the same time granting them the 
freedom associated with the practical person principle to decide the cases practically 
and factually.  
 
3.4.2. THE WEIGHT OF THE PRACTICAL PERSON PRINCIPLE 
The second aspect of the practical person principle is that it is to be accorded 
sufficient weight in the judicial decision-making process. In other words, the principle 
should be given sufficient influence over the outcome of a judgment to ensure that the 
problems discussed in Section 3.2 do not arise.  
 
Although the weight to be placed on the practical person principle in the judicial 
decision-making process is not decisively stated in Lever Brothers, there are a number 
of statements that point toward an answer. The most forthright of these is the 
statement by Davis AJA135 in which the practical person principle is described as a 
“test” that the court is “bound to adopt.” If this interpretation is followed, the use of 
the practical person principle is mandatory and must be accorded significant weight in 
coming to a conclusion. Schreiner JA undertakes a similar approach when it is stated 
that the views of the practical person are “entitled to great weight.”136  
 
The least prescriptive of the judges in Lever Brothers is Watermeyer CJ who refers to 
the practical person principle as a suggestion.137 This seemingly indicates that it does 
not need to be considered. It would appear, therefore, that there is no unanimous 
conclusion to this question in Lever Brothers. 
 
                                                
134 Including: CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A); CIR v Black 1957 (3) SA 536 (A); COT v British 
United Shoe Machinery (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1964 (3) SA 193 (FC); COT v R 1966 (2) SA 342 (RA); Tuck v 
CIR 1988 (3) SA 819 (A); Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1993 (4) SA 859 (A). 
135 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 464. 
136 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 463. 
137 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 457. 
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Assistance can be gained, however, from the Nathan case, in which it was held that 
the word “source” was intended by the Legislature to be “something which a practical 
man would regard as a real source of income.”138 This statement indicates that the 
Legislature intended something akin to the practical person principle to form a crucial 
part of the source of income enquiry. Over and above this, as discussed in Section 
3.2.1, it indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that the core of the source 
of income enquiry should be practical in nature. It follows, therefore, that the use of 
the practical person principle is not only anticipated by the Legislature, but it is also 
intended by it to be an important criterion for its location.  
 
The description above seems to accord with the scheme of Watermeyer CJ’s 
judgment in Lever Brothers. This approach is to use the practical person as a tool to 
assess each stage of the two-step framework. If this were not intended to be the case, 
it would have been unnecessary to consider the views of the practical person in his 
concluding remarks.139 This is especially significant since it is proposed that the 
practical person would come to the same conclusion as the one that had already been 
determined. Such deference to the practical person would have, therefore, been 
redundant had Watermeyer CJ not found it necessary to come to a conclusion based 
on the views of the hypothetical practical person.  
 
Given the scheme of Watermeyer CJ’s judgment, the agreement between Schreiner 
JA and Davis AJA, and the conclusions in Nathan, it necessarily follows that the 
practical person principle is a mandatory consideration. Furthermore, it would be 
nonsensical to require the evaluation of a concept that is not intended to contribute to 
a final decision. The practical person principle must, therefore, be accorded 
significant weight in determining source of income.  
 
3.4.3. SUBSTANCE IS GIVEN PRECEDENCE OVER FORM 
The third aspect of the practical person principle is that it requires the court to “look 
at the real substance of the transaction and not the technicalities and embroideries 
                                                
138 J Balazs “An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 
http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-
Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013). 
139 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 457. 
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surrounding it.”140 While this principle is an important characteristic of tax law in 
general,141 it is also a necessary result of the Nathan maxim. This is because of the 
great emphasis placed on the true facts of each case. Liang142 argues further that the 
source of income enquiry needs to be able to look at the true nature of a tax avoidance 
scheme. The practical person principle, therefore, gives the court the right to look past 
the form of a transaction and assess the matter on its substance.  
 
Despite this, Wills143 notes that Australian courts have tended to break away from the 
hard matter-of-fact approach. The result is a focus “on the formalities of the 
transaction concerned, rather than on where the economic activity which gave rise to 
the income occurred.”144 While this has been the lived experience of cases involving 
source of income in Australia, it is maintained that this is not a reflection of the true 
operation of the practical person principle. Wills makes it clear that this new approach 
is removed from the original ambit of the Nathan maxim145 and, therefore, by 
implication, the practical person principle.  
 
In order to give precedence to the substance of a matter over its form, it was held in 
FCT v United Aircraft Corporation146 that a case-by-case approach is sanctioned. In 
this regard it was held that “screens, pretexts, devices and other unrealities” should 
not get in the way of the court assessing the true nature of the facts at hand, and that 
“a decision on one set of facts is not binding and is often of little help on another set 
                                                
140 LH Kuan “Determining Sources of Income – A New Guiding Principle?” (1991) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 517 at 520. 
141 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530; Duke of Westminster v IRC [1936] AC 
1. See also TL Weston A Comparison of the Effectiveness of the Judicial Doctrine of "Substance Over 
Form" with Legislated Measures in Combatting Tax Avoidance (Masters Thesis, Rhodes University 
2004). 
142 TW Liang “The Source of Interest: Section 10 and Section 12(6) of the Income Tax Act” (1988) 30 
Malaya Law Review 393 at 399. 
143 M Wills “The Income Tax Implications of a Foreign Individual Contracting to do Business in 
Australia, with Particular Reference to Concepts of ‘Residence’ and ‘Source’” (1997) 9(1) Bond Law 
Review 34 at 46. 
144 M Wills “The Income Tax Implications of a Foreign Individual Contracting to do Business in 
Australia, with Particular Reference to Concepts of ‘Residence’ and ‘Source’” (1997) 9(1) Bond Law 
Review 34 at 46. 
145 M Wills “The Income Tax Implications of a Foreign Individual Contracting to do Business in 
Australia, with Particular Reference to Concepts of ‘Residence’ and ‘Source’” (1997) 9(1) Bond Law 
Review 34 at 46. 
146 FCT v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525 538. 
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of facts.”147 The effect of this is that every case must be decided on the basis of its 
own circumstances with an emphasis on its particular “hard facts.”  
 
3.4.4. TECHNICAL INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL RULES SET ASIDE 
The fourth aspect of the practical person principle, as noted indirectly by Davis AJA 
in Lever Brothers 148  is that it operates to prevent an unnecessarily artificial 
application of the law. This characteristic is succinctly summarised by Balazs as 
follows: 
 
What the cases require is that the truth of the matter be sought with an eye focused on 
practical business affairs, rather than on nice distinctions of the law. For the word 
“source”, in this context, has no precise or technical reference. It expresses only a 
general conception of origin, leading the mind broadly, by analogy. The true meaning 
of the word evokes springs in grottos at Delphi, sooner than the incidence of taxes. So 
the exactness which the lawyer is prone to seek must be consciously set aside; indeed, 
with respect to a choice between various contributing factors, it cannot be attained 
(emphasis added).149 
 
A similar sentiment can be found in the judgment of Schreiner JA in Lever 
Brothers150 where the importance of defining terms according to “ordinary linguistic 
usage” is stressed. What these two tools share, therefore, is the ability to look past a 
dogmatic adherence to established legal rules in cases where the application of such 
rules would lead to unjust results.  
 
Support for this conclusion can be found in FCT v Mitchum151 where it was held, 
referring to questions of source of income, that “there are no presumptions and no 
rules of law which require that that question be resolved in any particular sense.” This 
is, accordingly, a recognition that the role of judicial precedent in cases involving 
source of income may operate to unduly constrict the outcome of the case. This was 
confirmed in FCT v Efstathakis152 where it was held that “the answer is not to be 
                                                
147 FCT v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525 538. 
148 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 465. 
149 J Balazs “An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 
http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-
Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013).  
150 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 458. 
151 FCT v Mitchum (1965) 39 ALJR 23 26. 
152 FCT v Efstathakis (1979) ATC 4256 4259. 
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found in the cases, but in the weighing of the various factors which the cases have 
shown to be relevant.”  
 
These cases are, therefore, in line with the discussion in Section 3.4.3, which 
concluded that matters should be decided on a case-by-case basis. They, accordingly, 
lend support for the proposition that the role of judicial precedent is diminished in 
cases involving source of income.  
 
The remarks above are strikingly similar to those made by Nourse153 regarding the 
underlying application of the reasonable person in criminal law. She describes this 
concept as operating to guard against the overzealous application of legal doctrine to 
issues that are heavily contingent on the factual matrix of a specific case.154 In a 
similar way, the practical person principle can be seen as a tool that facilitates a 
departure from the strict application of legal rules and judicial precedent, to ensure 
that the facts of each case are considered in such a way that it achieves a just result. 
The practical person principle accomplishes this by removing the emphasis from strict 
formalism and placing it on practical reality.  
 
3.4.5. A FLEXIBLE CRITERION 
The fifth aspect of the practical person principle is that it operates to provide an 
exceptionally flexible criterion for the assessment of source of income cases. This is 
as a result of a number of intersecting factors. In the first place, the role of judicial 
precedent and the strict application of established legal norms are intentionally 
diminished. This provides, in the second instance, room for a case-by-case analysis. 
The emphasis of this analysis, in the third instance, is on the specific facts of the case 
through the lens of the practical person.  
 
The combination of these factors is vital for the source of income enquiry as it grants 
the necessary flexibility to overcome the two problems outlined in Section 3.2. The 
first problem, that there cannot be a universal test for determining source of income, 
                                                
153 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33. 
154 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 38. 
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is overcome by the operation of the practical person principle by placing a great deal 
of emphasis on the peculiar facts of each case. In this way, a comprehensive approach 
(the two-step framework coupled with the Nathan maxim) is created without 
producing a universal test that will apply in all cases.155 In fact, this approach is so 
flexible that it actively prohibits the creation of rules that will apply to future source 
of income cases.  
 
The second problem, that there cannot be an ultimate hierarchy of factors for 
determining source of income, is similarly overcome by the flexible practical person 
principle. Allowing cases to be decided according to practical reality, and by 
emphasising the substance-over-form of the transactions in question, leads to the 
situation in which competing factors can be weighed without establishing a permanent 
hierarchy. Again, this is supported by the emphasis on factual-precedence over 
judicial precedence.  
 
It is, therefore, clear that the operation of the practical person is necessarily flexible in 
nature. Consequentially, the crux of Watermeyer CJ’s contribution in Lever Brothers 
was the creation of a broad framework for the analysis of source of income 
complemented by the malleable practical person principle. This comprehensive 
approach operates to guide the method taken in future cases without hampering the 
judge’s ability to come to a conclusion based on the practical reality of the case at 
hand. In order to operate effectively, however, this guide must provide the necessary 
flexibility to overcome the problems outlined above. The result of this is an 
exceptionally flexible criterion for the decision of cases concerning source of income. 
 
3.4.6. ALIGN THE LAW WITH PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
The final aspect of the operation of the practical person principle is one that was not 
necessarily intended by the authorities that established the source framework; 
however, it is suggested that it is of growing importance given the advent of 
constitutionalism in South Africa. That is, that the practical person principle provides 
a useful mechanism to align the law with public perceptions of it. 
                                                
155 M Wills “The Income Tax Implications of a Foreign Individual Contracting to do Business in 
Australia, with Particular Reference to Concepts of ‘Residence’ and ‘Source’” (1997) 9(1) Bond Law 
Review 34 at 46. 
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Devenish156 argues that the implementation of the interim Constitution157 brought 
with it an extension of the values of the community (boni mores) to all forms of law. 
The effect of this is to transport South Africa from a culture of authority to one of 
justification158 with the result that the laws of the country should broadly reflect the 
views of our heterogeneous community.159 Support for this can be found in the 
preamble to the Constitution160 which begins with the statement “we the people” 
signifying that it has the support of the nation as a whole. Since all law must be 
consistent with the Constitution,161 the implication is that all law should be supported 
by “the people” as far as reasonably possible.  
 
The practical person principle, in its deference to the views of the ordinary people of 
the country, therefore, provides a mechanism that may potentially be used by judges 
to ensure that the outcome of each case is in line with the views of the South African 
community. It is argued that this is an important goal in a society that seems to value 
the creation of exceptionally complex pieces of legislation in spite the reality of 
pervasive illiteracy.  
 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The Lever Brothers case is a landmark decision in South Africa’s tax jurisprudence as 
it introduced the comprehensive approach for determining source of income. This 
approach has since been approved on numerous occasions and has become the 
authoritative position for determining source of income in South Africa.  
 
The key to the success of the comprehensive approach is its ability to prescribe a 
method for finding source of income that gives judges the structure of the two-step 
framework, while at the same time granting them the freedom associated with the 
practical person principle to decide the cases practically and factually. In this way, the 
comprehensive approach effectively overcomes the problems inherent in the source 
enquiry in general as well as with the two-step framework in particular. It manages to 
                                                
156 GE Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 23. 
157 The Constitution of the Republic of South Arica Act 200 of 1993.  
158 GE Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 23. 
159 GE Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 23. 
160 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
161 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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give guidance to judges without prescribing a universal test or creating an ultimate 
hierarchy.  
 
At the core of the comprehensive approach is the Nathan maxim, which requires an 
emphasis on practical reality and the hard facts of the case. These principles are 
personified in the form of the practical person, which provides a mechanism to come 
to conclusions on the basis of practicality rather than philosophy.  
 
The practical person principle, consequentially, provides judges with a lens through 
which the two-step framework must be seen. With sufficient weight on this so-called 
attitude of mind, judges are able to give effect to the true substance of a matter and 
ignore technical legal rules that would otherwise lead to unjust results. At the heart of 
the practical person principle is, therefore, a flexible criterion that allows judges to 
decide cases according to practical reality. If used correctly this tool may also 
enhance the ability of judges to align the law with public perceptions of it and, 
correspondingly, enhance the legitimacy of the law.  
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CHAPTER 4: CRITIQUE OF THE PRACTICAL PERSON 
 
A debt is a legal obligation, something having no corporeal 
existence; consequently it can have no real and actual situation in 
the material world. Metaphorically, however, by legal fiction, it 
may have a situation in a place, determined by accepted legal rules  
– Watermeyer CJ, Lever Brothers 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The practical person principle outlined in Chapter 3 provides an elegant solution to 
the problems inherent to the source of income inquiry. The introduction of this 
principle as a tool for deciding such cases was, therefore, a fitting strategy adopted in 
the cases following Nathan and culminating in the comprehensive approach adopted 
in Lever Brothers. The striking feature of Lever Brothers, however, is that each of the 
judges was able to use the practical person principle to come to a completely different 
conclusion. This judicial discord, while not necessarily problematic in and of itself, is 
possibly an indication of a deeper concern with the tools used in the judicial decision-
making process.  
 
This chapter will critically analyse the precedent set down in Lever Brothers and 
argue that, instead of creating a framework that is worthy of the praise it has received, 
the judges entrenched a flawed concept that actively undermines several central 
aspects of our justice system: the doctrine of judicial precedent, prospective 
application of the law, legal certainty, legality and the rule of law.  
 
This critique will be carried out on two levels. First, the problems with the practical 
person in practice will be discussed. These problems are particular to the way the 
practical person principle was used in Lever Brothers: that it is inadequately defined 
and that it improperly combines analytically separate enquiries. These problems may, 
therefore, be overcome by recasting the practical person principle in a different 
mould. It will be argued that the approach suggested by Nourse provides a suitable 
solution to these problems by looking to the underlying operation of the principle and 
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by describing a new conception of the principle that is based on its true operation 
rather than on the visage of the practical person. 
 
The second level of critique will look at the problems with the practical approach in 
principle. These problems arise out of the broad approach to source of income and 
are, therefore, independent of the guise that the practical person is given. They can, 
thus, be attributed to an application of the principles that underlie the practical person, 
first that the practical person is incapable of dealing with complex legal issues and, 
second, that its inherent flexibility leaves room to its manipulation by judges, both 
consciously and subconsciously.  
 
It is this second critique of the practical person principle that illustrates its 
predisposition to cause the problems listed above. These “down-stream effects” of the 
underlying principles are then briefly discussed in order to illustrate the severity of the 
problem it presents. 
 
4.2. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE 
The first set of problems with the practical person principle arises out of the way the 
principle has been used traditionally and in particular in the Lever Brothers judgment. 
These are, therefore, problems with the manner in which the principle is described 
and may be overcome by re-describing the principle.162 This section will set out two 
key problems with the principle as it has been used. First, that the practical person 
principle does not provide an adequate description of the characteristics of the 
personified standard that ought to be used, and second, that it over-burdens the 
metaphor by combining separate enquiries. Both of these problems, therefore, arise 
out of the act of anthropomorphising the principle. Nourse, analysing the similar 
concept of the “reasonable person” from criminal law, argues that these problems if 
“conceived differently, might disappear.”163  
 
                                                
162 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 36. 
163 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 36.  
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4.2.1. PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE DESCRIPTION 
The first problem with an anthropomorphised practical person is the question of 
identity. Who is the practical person? In Section 3.3 it is concluded that the Lever 
Brothers judgment failed to give a clear description of the practical person and that 
the anthropomorphised figure is used as a vague approximation of the underlying 
legal principles described in the Nathan maxim. The practical person is, accordingly, 
the embodiment of the principles required by the source of income enquiry. In this 
way, the practical person is similar to the reasonable person. They are both used to 
convey the appropriate standard by which a case should be decided to the judge.164 
The problem with this, as Nourse165 illustrates, is that image conveyed by the 
anthropomorphised practical person brings with it more than just the legal principles 
behind it. It allows judges to introduce their own conceptions of the characteristics of 
the practical person into the decision-making process.  
 
In order to remove the vagueness associated with the practical person personification, 
the concept must, therefore, be defined more exactly. This would have the effect of 
circumscribing the standard that judges should apply to the decision-making process. 
The more accurately the standard can be demarcated, the less latitude there will be for 
the concept to be misused through the judge’s own ideas of practicality. In this regard, 
Nourse asks, for example, whether this concept should take account of characteristics 
such as age, sex or culture,166 or whether it should be seen as a “statistical norm of the 
average or ideal or something else entirely (emphasis added).”167 
 
In R v Camplin,168 the court, also discussing the reasonable person, importantly 
concluded that it is the “ordinary person.” It is a description of how ordinary people 
are expected by their fellow citizens to act in society.169 The problem with this, 
however, is determining who the ordinary person is. For the present purposes, what 
practicality can be considered ordinary? This is important because differences 
                                                
164 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146 172 E - F. 
165 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 40. 
166 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 35. 
167 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 40. 
168 R v Camplin 1978 AC 705. 
169 R v Camplin 1978 AC 705. 
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between people on the basis of sex, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, age etc. cannot, it 
is advocated, be averaged out. This is the case for two reasons: first, that historical 
differences between people cannot simply be forgotten as to do so would be to neglect 
the distorting effect of centuries of discrimination. South Africa has also made a 
commitment in section 9(2) of the Constitution to correct the effects of historical 
discrimination. Second, South Africa has also made a constitutional commitment to 
recognise and protect legitimate differences between people.170  
 
Any attempt to homologise the differences implicit in a heterogeneous society will, 
therefore, fail to properly account for both the effects of institutionalised 
discrimination as well as important cultural differences.171 The effect of this is that the 
“ordinary man” sought by R v Camplin172 cannot account for the varied societal 
expectations of what it means to be practical. In other words, how society expects 
people to react to a situation may differ widely from group to group. Similarly, for the 
present case, the standard of practicality will vary across society.  
 
The problem of description can, therefore, be summed up as a tension between the 
general and the specific: on the one hand, the personified practical person cannot give 
judges too much room to impute their own conceptions of practicality onto the matter, 
as to do so would render the standard unduly vague.173 On the other hand, however, 
the notion of an “ordinary person” is illusory; this is because the more particularly the 
standard is defined, the less meaningful its application becomes in a heterogeneous 
society. Essentially, the only way for the practical person to have any value is for it to 
be decidedly unrepresentative or undemocratic. The personified practical person, 
therefore, finds itself truly torn between “Scylla and Charybdis.” 
 
                                                
170 Section 9 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; GE Devenish The South 
African Constitution (2005) 18. 
171 GE Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 18-19. 
172 R v Camplin 1978 AC 705. 
173 This is something that Watermeyer CJ and Schreiner JA seem confortable with since they both 
equate their conclusions with those of the practical person. 
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4.2.2. PROBLEM OF CONFLATING SEPARATE INQUIRIES 
The second problem with the anthropomorphised practical person is that combines 
“analytically separate enquiries.”174 Nourse, writing with reference to the concept of 
the reasonable person, argues that the use of this tool as a standard for judgment 
creates theoretical tensions in the way it balances subjective and objective approaches 
to a criminal case. The reasonable person sets out to achieve, according to Nourse, a 
method of giving adequate credence to a person’s subjective state of affairs when 
applying an objective framework of rules.  
 
This is summed up in the case of R v Smith (Morgan)175 as follows: 
 
[the reasonable person is] a way of explaining the law to a jury; an 
anthropomorphic image to convey to them, with suitable degree of vividness, the 
legal principle that even under provocation, people must conform to an objective 
standard of behaviour that society is entitled to expect. 
 
The problem is essentially that, in criminal cases for example, the person on trial must 
be tried according to their own characteristics. In other words there must be a 
subjective approach. This approach would, however, lead to injustices where it is 
applied too strictly. As Nourse notes “the defendant’s norms will acquit him.”176 This 
requires an objective approach. An overly objective approach on the other hand may 
be similarly unjust since important factors such as the defendant’s age, mental 
capacity and physical characteristics, as examples, will be disregarded.177 Many 
countries have, therefore, adopted a hybrid approach: one that treats defendants 
subjectively but then also requires that they comply with a certain standard expected 
by society. This standard is that of the reasonable person.178  
 
The hybrid approach, however, is not without difficulty; it has been described as 
creating a tension that appears to unite opposite theoretical approaches. In this regard 
                                                
174 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 38. 
175 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146 172 E - F. 
176 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 36. 
177 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33. 
178 Alternatively termed in various legal areas: the layperson, prudent person or bonus pater familias 
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it requires that cases be judged objectively, implying strict adherence to the rules, as 
well as subjectively, allowing important flexibility. In another sense, the hybrid 
approach can be seen as blurring the distinction between facts and norms: objectivity 
requires an abstract application of norms while subjectivity requires that the factual 
context be given priority.179  
 
The application of the reasonable person has the effect, according to Nourse,180 of 
hiding these tensions by conflating these separate enquiries. The result of this is that 
we are forced to “whipsaw between hypermajoritarian views (the [objective] standard 
of the law-abiding) and hyperminoritarian views (the [subjective] standard of the 
particular defendant).”181  
 
It is contended that similar tensions between facts and norms arise out of the use of 
the practical person principle in source of income cases: there are legal concepts that 
must be applied but, the court in the Nathan case was aware that if a prescriptive body 
of law were to develop, this would lead to unjust results.182 The practical person 
principle as set out in Section 3.2, therefore, operates to allow a practical approach to 
the facts of each case.  
 
The problem with this, however, lies in the personification of these underlying 
principles. By conflating these principles into a single enquiry, the true operation of 
the practical person is lost. The effect of this is illustrated in the Lever Brothers case. 
Both Watermeyer CJ and Schreiner JA adopt majoritarian (objective) approaches to 
determining the source of income. In other words, they both use legal reasoning to 
come to a preliminary conclusion and then justify this conclusion with reference to 
the practical person. It is argued, that this use of the practical person principle, as an 
after-the-fact justification for a conclusion that has already been arrived at, is a 
misunderstanding of the tool’s purpose to mediate the tension between fact and law. 
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In other words, it ought to operate to achieve a decision that is supported objectively 
in law without being disconnected from the subjective reality of the particular facts of 
the case.  
 
The judgment of Davis AJA on the other hand illustrates the “whipsaw” tendency of 
such anthropomorphisations by allowing him to take the polar opposite approach to 
the facts in Lever Brothers. Davis AJA predicated his decision entirely on the 
application of the practical person principle to the facts of the case. In this way, the 
judgment is devoid of any reference to objective norms. Again, approaching questions 
of source of income from a purely a fact-based, subjective point of view fails to 
accommodate the full application of the practical person principle.  
 
4.2.3. SOLUTION: REFLECT AND RESTRAIN 
The solution to the problems outlined in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 argues Nourse,183 is 
to conceive the anthropomorphic image differently. She argues that it is not the nature 
of the inquiry that causes these tensions but rather it is its form. By looking to the 
underlying operation of the reasonable person principle, Nourse devises a way to 
disentangle the separate enquiries, and creates a two-step structured process.184  
 
The heart of the personified concept, Nourse argues, is that the reasonable person is a 
tool for preventing legal norms from being applied too strictly to a particular case. 
What it sets out to achieve, therefore, is an effective way of reflecting the law as it 
stands and then restraining its overzealous application by requiring that the factual 
matrix be considered.185 This structured approach, it is contended, captures the similar 
operation of the practical person principle in source of income cases. In such cases, 
there are legal concepts that must be applied; however, the court in Nathan, it is 
reasoned, was aware that if a prescriptive body of law were to develop, this would 
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lead to unjust results.186 The solution developed in Nathan and implemented in Lever 
Brothers was to use the practical person concept as a mechanism to restrain the law 
when its application to a particular set of facts would lead to unjust results. As shown 
in Section 3.4 the practical person principle facilitates a departure from the strict 
application of legal rules and judicial precedent to ensure that a just result is achieved.  
 
By looking to the true operation of the practical person as a tool to reflect and restrain 
the application of the law to a particular case, it is argued that the problems outlined 
in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 disappear. This is because the enquiry is no longer 
predicated on an anthropomorphised standard. In the first instance it does not require 
that judges decide cases with reference to the views of any particular person or group 
of people. This means that the task of judging matters of source of income is no 
longer prone to the problems of overly general or overly specific descriptions of the 
standard of practicality.  
 
In the second instance, the two-step structured approach provided by Nourse,187 
avoids overburdening the metaphor of the practical person by separating the inquiries 
to be undertaken. The effect of this is to mediate the tendency to adopt approaches to 
determining the source of income that are either overly objective or overly subjective. 
Instead, it requires that all cases proceed from a legal foundation and then, where this 
would lead to unjust results, restrain the strict operation of the law. The method for 
achieving such restraint is through deference to practicality and the hard facts of the 
specific case at hand. Essentially by using the un-personified principles of the Nathan 
maxim. 
 
If this approach were adopted in the Lever Brothers case, it would have prevented the 
judges from proceeding from radically different assumptions of the role of the 
practical person. In this regard, all of the judges made a mistake in their applications 
of the concept. Davis AJA was incorrect to neglect an analysis of the normative 
framework, while Watermeyer CJ and Schreiner JA were incorrect to justify their 
                                                
186 J Balazs “An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined” (2009) 7 
http://www.blwllp.com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-
Determined--.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013). 
187 V Nourse “After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question” (2008) 
11(1) New Criminal Law Review 33 at 50. 
 53 
conclusions with reference to the practical person. Instead, the correct approach 
would have entailed applying the law to the facts of the case and then asking whether 
this application had the effect of creating an unjust outcome. If the outcome were 
unjust, the judges would be permitted to restrain the application of the law to the 
facts.  
 
This approach provides judges with a framework with which to decide cases that does 
not require an evaluation of the characteristics of a personified practical person. At 
the same time, it allows the flexibility required to ensure that a prescriptive body of 
law does not develop. This effectively prevents the overzealous application of 
established rules to cases where the result would be unduly harsh or unjust. The tenets 
of the Nathan maxim – practicality and factual-precedence – are, therefore, protected 
by the reflect and restrain approach while at the same time the problems that arise out 
of its personification are avoided.  
 
4.3. PROBLEMS IN PRINCIPLE 
It has been shown that removing the anthropomorphic visage from the judicial 
approach to determining source of income overcomes the problems set out in Section 
4.2. This means adopting an approach that seeks to reflect and restrain the law. The 
restraint necessary to avoid the overzealous application of legal doctrine is achieved 
through an un-personified application of the Nathan maxim. This can, therefore, be 
seen as a refinement of the comprehensive approach set out in Chapter 3 and, in this 
way, the flexibility inherent to the source of income inquiry is maintained, and the 
problems discussed in Section 3.2 continue to be averted.  
 
This refinement may prevent the problems illustrated in Section 4.2, however, deeper 
problems with the source enquiry remain. These problems arise out of the 
foundational premise that a universal test for source of income cannot be developed 
and, therefore, that a practical, hard matter-of-fact approach must be taken. These 
problems may, therefore, be thought of as arising out of the application of a meta-
practical person principle, under which the substance of the principle is accepted but 
not its anthropomorphised form. This section will argue that, by succumbing to the 
notion that source of income must be defined in this manner, the court in Nathan 
 54 
created a flawed concept that would in the first place be unable to give guidance on 
complex legal issues and in the second place provide an unduly flexible criterion for 
decision-making.  
 
These two problems, it is argued, arise out of the very nature of the source of income 
enquiry if it is seen as having “no precise or technical reference.”188 Furthermore, if – 
as we have been led to believe thus far – “the exactness which the lawyer is prone to 
seek must be consciously set aside”189 when deciding source of income, a number of 
negative down-stream effects will likely arise. These will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
 
4.3.1. INABILITY TO DEAL WITH COMPLEX ISSUES 
The first problem that arises out of the general conception of source of income as a 
practical, hard matter of fact is that the enquiry is not suited to dealing with complex 
legal issues. This is because the refined comprehensive approach (the two-step 
framework applied through the lens of practicality and factual-precedence of the 
Nathan maxim) requires certain legal questions to be determined practically. This is 
despite the fact, however, that many aspects of the law are designed to operate in a 
manner that is contrary to practical application. This problem was illustrated in the 
Lever Brothers case when Watermeyer CJ held that,  
  
[a] debt is a legal obligation, something having no corporeal existence; consequently 
it can have no real and actual situation in the material world. Metaphorically, 
however, by legal fiction, it may have a situation in a place, determined by accepted 
legal rules (emphasis added).190 
 
The problematic dichotomy between abstract legal rules and concrete practical 
approaches is also highlighted by Schreiner JA who notes that, “the location of an 
incorporeal in space by a rule of law carries a flavour of artificiality” (emphasis 
added).191 What Schreiner JA notices, therefore, is that the artificiality of such rules is 
clearly in conflict with practicality, which by its nature is not artificial. 
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Before delving deeper into this issue, a distinction must first be drawn between the 
current problem – that complex legal issues cannot be reconciled with practicality – 
and the problem set out in Section 4.2.2 – that the personified practical person 
operates to conflate factual and legal questions. The problem associated with the 
personification of the practical person is that it unduly merges objective and 
subjective standards with the result that there is no mechanism to determine when it is 
appropriate to depart from accepted legal rules. By removing the anthropomorphic 
visage, it is shown that the true operation of the principle, as a tool to prevent the 
overzealous application of the law to the facts, can be maintained without inducing 
the confusion illustrated in Lever Brothers. What the “reflect and restrain” approach 
does not do is remove practicality from the question. Indeed the method of restraining 
the law is through deference to the practicality and the hard facts of the case. In other 
words, it is through the application of the Nathan maxim. The present problem, 
however, is with the very application of practicality to issues that have been defined 
abstractly. This issue, therefore, cannot be removed by looking at the principles in a 
different manner as it is tied to the very nature and existence of the principle itself.  
 
Regarding the present problem, it is stated that the question of source is not a legal 
issue but a factual question. The relationship between factual and legal questions may, 
however, be blurred in difficult cases. It is clear that Watermeyer CJ’s two-step 
framework provides an efficient method of reconciling the inherent practicality of 
source of income with a legal framework. This is because the framework is crafted as, 
ostensibly, two questions of fact. First, what is the originating cause of income and, 
second, where is it located. These questions do not, however, account for the entire 
enquiry. This is because there are legal questions that must be answered before the 
question of fact can be addressed. In the Lever Brothers case these legal issues meant 
an adequate description of the incorporeal debt.192 After all, incorporeals of this kind 
are created by operation of the law and must, therefore, be fully described in legal 
terms. Seen in this light, Watermeyer CJ’s two questions of fact are no more than 
methods of accessing deeper legal questions.  
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According to the Nathan maxim, however, these deeper legal questions are to be 
determined practically. The effect of this is to dilute the concept of practicality to such 
a degree that it can no longer perform the function for which it was originally 
introduced – that is to prevent an application of legal principles to the case at hand. It 
follows that the practical approach becomes synonymous with a legalistic approach to 
certain questions. This approach is, therefore, a tautology for the judge’s own 
legalistic reasoning. This is something with which Watermeyer CJ and Schreiner JA 
seem comfortable, as they both equate the views of the practical person with those of 
the theoretical lawyer.193 
 
4.3.2. PROBLEM OF INHERENT FLEXIBILITY 
The second problem with the conception that source of income is a practical question 
is that it provides an unduly flexible criterion to be used in the judicial decision-
making process. As illustrated in Chapter 3, however, it is one of the key 
characteristics of the practical person principle (as a personification of the Nathan 
maxim) that it grants judges the flexibility necessary to overcome the problems 
inherent to the source of income enquiry that were outlined in Section 3.2. This lack 
of specificity necessarily flows from the task that the practical person was enlisted to 
perform.  
 
The problem with flexibility is that, as Balazs notes, “reality is in the eye of the 
beholder.”194 While on the one hand, this reality – the factual matrix of the case – is 
what the practical person principle is intended to facilitate the judge in arriving at, on 
the other hand, this flexibility does not provide judges with adequate direction in 
achieving this. Kuan argues further, that this practical approach is “extremely flexible 
and does not offer much guidance to the courts so that in unusual factual situations it 
is possible for the courts to go astray.”195 In essence, judges are given too much 
leeway to introduce extraneous considerations into their decision-making process 
under the guise of practicality. This can happen in one of two broad ways: first, the 
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principle can be easily manipulated consciously to suit one’s own purposes; second, 
the principle is liable to subconscious manipulation. These will be discussed in turn 
below. 
 
Conscious Manipulation 
One of the ways in which the flexibility inherent to the practical approach can affect 
the outcome of a judgment is through conscious manipulation. Such manipulation, 
however, need not be malicious; the principle may be co-opted simply in support of a 
judge’s genuinely benevolent findings in a matter. In other words, the judge may 
employ the tool incorrectly as an after-the-fact justification rather than a tool that 
should be used to come to a conclusion. Whatever the motivation for such a use of the 
principle of practicality, it is an incorrect approach. Furthermore, there seems to be 
evidence of this occurring in the judgments of Watermeyer CJ and Schreiner JA in 
Lever Brothers as they each presented legal arguments in support of a position, and 
subsequently held that the practical person would have concurred with these 
conclusions. 
 
There is no evidence of maleficence on the part of the judges in the Lever Brothers 
case; however, this does not preclude the principle being used in such a manner in 
other cases. This is largely because the tractability offered by practicality provides 
sufficient room to introduce ulterior motivations into their judicial-making. In this 
way, judges are given leeway to come to conclusions that are not founded in law or 
some other principled application of reason. Instead, they may make conclusions on 
the basis of any number of self-interested preconceptions. It would be beyond the 
present scope to investigate the plethora of potential motivators, however, given that 
they are there to operate; it is concerning that the practical approach does not guard 
against them. Furthermore, given that it is necessary for the judiciary to be held in 
high regard – in order for its decisions to be legitimate – it would be problematic if 
the judiciary were seen to be making decisions on the basis of the personal interests of 
its judges.  
 
Subconscious Manipulation 
As well as the conscious use of the practicality principle as a tool to support one’s 
argument, the flexibility inherent to this concept may lend itself to being manipulated 
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subconsciously. Judges, as with all people, are subject to a host of identified 
psychological biases. These come in various forms: some appear to be innate to all 
people and are possibly rooted in our biology while others are acquired through the 
elaborate process of socialisation that moulds us throughout our lives. A quick glance 
through the law reports reveals, for example, how the changes in social attitude are 
reflected in changes of judicial approach. A good example of this is the dichotomous 
approaches taken in Duke of Westminster v IRC196 and COT v Ferrera.197 In the 
former case it was held that tax avoidance was a legitimate pursuit, as people should 
be entitled to structure their business activities so as to minimise their tax exposure so 
long as this is within the limits of the law. In the latter case, however, such avoidance 
was held to be “an evil”198 by which certain taxpayers foist their civic responsibility 
to contribute to the fiscus onto those around them. 
 
Recent research has taken strides toward uncovering some of the biases implicit in all 
people and in judges specifically. Sarnikar, Sorensen and Oaxaca199 studied data 
obtained from the United States Sentencing Commission, and came to the conclusion 
that on average women receive “15.4 months less prison time than men.” This was 
after controlling for the severity of the offence, the criminal history of the offender 
and “gender [sic] differences in individual circumstances.”200 These data clearly point 
toward a strong bias on the part of a number of judges toward giving women more 
lenient prison sentences. 
 
Over and above these biases, people are also subject to what has been termed the 
“Bias Blind Spot” which causes us to be comparatively unaware of our own biases as 
opposed to those of others.201 The cumulative effects of being biased and unaware of 
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it provides fertile ground for, albeit subconsciously. The blind spot bias means, 
furthermore, that you cannot always take steps to achieve greater objectivity. 
 
It is possible that the conclusions reached in the Lever Brothers judgment were 
affected by subconscious biases of some kind. Although there is no direct evidence of 
this occurring, as is necessarily the case with subconscious bias, there are a number of 
historical events that would have likely influenced the judges’ reasoning. Watermeyer 
CJ, for example, initially studied mathematics at Cambridge University.202 It is, 
therefore, likely that the insights he gained from this background spilled-over into his 
particular judicial style. The Chairman of the Special Income Tax Court even noted 
that “[Watermeyer CJ’s] knowledge of mathematics stood him in good stead and his 
lucid judgments clarified many obscure points in this difficult branch of the Law.”203 
Watermeyer CJ’s mathematical style is further evidenced by his routinely rigorous 
and systematic approach to the law.204 In this vein, Watermeyer CJ has also been 
described as “an erudite Roman-Dutch lawyer.”205 As Thackwell206 shows, a number 
of Watermeyer CJ’s decisions involved an exposition of the Roman-Dutch law at the 
core of the case. This style of evaluating the “first principles” of a matter is also 
illustrated in Watermeyer CJ’s approach to the facts in Lever Brothers. Overall, it 
seems likely that the approach taken by Watermeyer CJ in Lever Brothers was 
influenced by his mathematical training as well as the high esteem in which he held 
Roman-Dutch law. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the systematic two-step 
framework that the Lever Brothers case is famous for is a product of Watermeyer 
CJ’s attitude of mind over and above the particular requirements of the source of 
income enquiry.  
 
Schreiner JA on the other hand obtained a Bachelor of Arts from the University of the 
Cape of Good Hope.207 He then proceeded to read for his BCL at Cambridge 
University.208 In direct contrast to Watermeyer CJ, Schreiner JA reported only 
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attending one lecture on Roman-Dutch law and his judgments seldom involved a deep 
investigation into the historical foundations of the law.209 In fact, upon his promotion 
to the Appellate Division Schreiner JA described the different approach taken by 
Watermeyer CJ as follows: 
 
The work is markedly more thoroughly done than when one sits in the Provincial 
Division . . . [Some] matters are heard . . . that one would be ready to dispose of in a 
rough and ready fashion without much delay, but we go over them with the utmost 
care and choose the words . . . that leave no room for mistake . . . The Chief, Billy 
(Watermeyer CJ), is a very wise judge with a big and well-stored brain. He guides 
our discussions with the artistry of a company chairman. 
 
Despite his respect for Watermeyer CJ, it is not surprising that Schreiner JA – coming 
from a distinctly different background – would come to different conclusions in the 
Lever Brothers case; especially when given the opportunity to depart from fixed legal 
doctrine.  
 
Regarding Davis AJA, it is interesting to note that he had once bragged that he had 
never come to a different conclusion from his good friend Watermeyer CJ.210 
Curiously enough this statement remained true for the Lever Brothers case.  
 
Overall, it is argued that judges – as is the case with all people – are not objective, 
unbiased arbiters of justice. Instead they are perpetually influenced by a complex set 
of biases and predispositions that tint the lens through which they see the world. More 
importantly, our pre-disposition to believe that our view of the world is the correct 
one keeps us unaware of the biases that cloud our view. The result of this is that the 
popular adage that lawyers must tailor their case to the particular sentiments and 
sensibilities of the judge has become almost cliché. Bringing these conclusions to the 
present matter, the problem with the principle that source of income should be 
determined through a lens of practicality is that it gives judges license to remain 
uncritical of their biases. Instead, an approach predicated on practicality seems to 
invite a subjective – common sense – approach to a matter whereas other approaches 
attempt to dissuade it. It is, therefore, evident that the flexibility offered by the 
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practical approach to determining source of income is problematic as it leaves such 
cases vulnerable to the subconscious sensibilities of the particular judge.  
 
4.4. DOWN-STREAM NEGATIVE EFFECTS 
It is illustrated above that the flexibility offered by an approach that is based on 
practicality means that the outcome of such cases will be open to manipulation – both 
consciously and subconsciously. Over and above this, such an approach is not well 
suited to dealing with complex legal issues that require an analysis of legal fictions 
and metaphor. It has also been made clear that these problems arise out of the 
substance of the source of income enquiry and not its form. In this way, these 
problems have been shown to arise out of the very conception that source of income is 
to determined practically and factually. Seen in this light, the characteristics of the 
practical person that were outlined in Chapter 3 prove to create greater problems than 
the one that they propose to solve. These problems can, therefore, be seen as the 
down-stream effects of adopting a flexible practical approach to determining source 
of income. In other words, these problems are the direct result of the decision that 
there should be no ultimate test for the determination of source of income.  
 
4.4.1. UNDERMINES JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
The first problem that results from the conception that there should be no ultimate test 
for the determination of source of income is that it involves an excessive erosion of 
the doctrine of judicial precedent (stare decisis). As illustrated in Section 3.4 one of 
the key effects of the Nathan maxim is that matters should be decided on a case-by-
case basis. This means that, as confirmed in FCT v Efstathakis,211 “the answer is not 
to be found in cases but in the weighing of the various factors which the cases have 
shown to be relevant.” The practical approach was, therefore, developed in order to 
prevent a strict application of legal rules and instead facilitate an approach based on a 
kind of factual-precedence.  
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In order to sustain such an approach, however, the role of judicial precedent must be 
sacrificed. Nevertheless, according to Rycroft,212 judicial precedent is important for 
maintaining uniformity in the legal system. Furthermore, Rycroft argues that 
abandoning the concept “ultimately reduces public confidence in the courts and the 
independence of judges.”213 The result of this is that judicial decisions become more 
arbitrary as they are left to the response of the particular judge. Kruuse also notes that 
the primary value of judicial precedent is its promotion of legal certainty – This will 
be discussed further in Section 4.4.3. In sum, judicial precedent promotes a necessary 
consistency in the legal system that ensures that similar cases are treated similarly.  
 
Despite the foundational importance of the doctrine of judicial precedent in our 
judicial system as well the advantages of its application, there have been several 
proponents of a softening of the doctrine in recent years.214 In this regard, Woolman 
and Brand ask: “should we slavishly adhere to stare decisis or the application of 
precedent for the purposes of legal stability even where such stability works an 
injustice?”215 Similar thinking has lead Rycroft to propose a set of criteria that may be 
used when considering departing from judicial precedent. 216  These include the 
following questions: has the rule proved to be intolerable; would reliance on the rule 
lead to a special kind of hardship in the present case; have the principles of law been 
abandoned over time; have the facts changed so as to warrant a different conclusion; 
is the recent decision in conflict with a prior sound decision; and does the decision 
prevent the achievement of other important legal objectives? This checklist provides a 
useful tool for determining when it would be appropriate to depart from judicial 
precedent. Importantly, what this approach achieves is a sound method of softening 
the doctrine in such a way that it does not give judges “carte blanche with each and 
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every judgment.”217 Accordingly, it does not “bring adjudications… into the same 
class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.”218 
 
The erosion of the doctrine of judicial precedent that is the result of the practical 
approach to determining source of income is, however, not subject to the reasoned 
constraints set out above. Instead, it is a key aspect of the practical approach that 
cases are decided without deference to previous judgments and that judges are given 
carte blanche with the particular facts. It is a blanket abolition of the doctrine. It 
follows that the flexible practical approach truly brings such judgments into the class 
of restricted railroad tickets and is, therefore, unwarranted.  
 
4.4.2. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
The second problem with the conception that there should be no ultimate test for the 
determination of source of income is that it allows for a retrospective application of 
the law. In a constitutional democracy where the courts have the power of judicial 
review – as is the case in South Africa due to section 1 of the Constitution219 – there is 
some degree to which judicial decisions will alter the law and, therefore, apply the 
law retrospectively. This is especially the case when the Constitutional Court declares 
certain legislation to be unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid. It is, however, 
impermissible for the law to apply retrospectively as this would have the unjust result 
of holding people accountable to standards that have not yet been established. In order 
to avoid these problems, the doctrine of “objective constitutional invalidity,”220 
operates to presume that such legislation was always invalid due to its conflict with 
the Constitution and that all the court has done is confirm this invalidity.  
 
In cases regarding the determination of source of income a similar problem appears. 
This problem is that the case must be determined practically on its particular facts; 
this means that the judges are making a decision on what is practical as the facts of 
each case arise. This results in a retrospective application of the law. Ordinarily, 
however, a fiction similar to that of the doctrine of objective constitutional invalidity 
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could operate which would state that the practical outcome has always been known 
and that, therefore, the legal position on a particular set of facts would have been clear 
to the parties before the transaction was entered into. The issue arises, however, when 
the flexibility of the practical approach is considered. In Section 4.3 it was argued that 
such flexibility allows for a significant degree of judicial discordance. The result of 
this is that it becomes impossible to predict the outcome of a case in advance. Such an 
operation of the practical approach, therefore, prevents such a fiction from operating. 
Hence, the flexibility inherent to the practical approach has the absurd result of 
holding people to a standard that cannot have been known before the judgment has 
been decided.  
 
Allowing cases to be decided on the basis of a case-by-case application of a flexible 
standard has the further result of undermining the principle of ignorantia jusis non 
excusat (that ignorance of the law is not an excuse). This principle essentially 
presumes that everyone has knowledge of the law. Its purpose is to prevent the 
defence that a person was unaware of the law and, therefore, should not be punished 
for a contravention thereof. In order for this principle to be given credence there is a 
minimum level of legal understanding that is required in the general public. If cases 
are being decided on a case-by-case basis with deference to an approach that 
facilitates judicial discordance there is no way for people to be able to know the 
outcome of a particular case in advance. In other words, people will be unable to 
bring their actions in line with the law before judicial pronouncement.  
 
The effect of the above conclusions is essentially that the law, as it applies to 
determining source of income, can be seen as a creature of retrospective application. 
It would, therefore, be a fallacy for people to be expected to know the law in a 
particular case where it is yet to be created. The further effect of this is that people are 
unable to structure their business transactions in accordance with the law. 
 
4.4.3. UNDERMINES LEGAL CERTAINTY 
The cumulative effect of the above two submissions strongly suggests that the 
conception that there should be no ultimate test for the determination of source of 
income radically erodes legal certainty. It does this by giving judges too much scope 
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to deal with cases individually and by allowing them to use a concept that provides 
too much freedom. The Lever Brothers judgment is a prime example of the 
discordance that can result from judges being given “too much rope.”  
 
Legal certainty, it is contended, is achieved through the complex interplay of a 
number of aspects of the legal system: the law must be sufficiently ascertainable and 
understandable to the general public; the law should – as much as constitutionally 
defensible – align with public perceptions of it; and the law should be sufficiently 
stable over time. 221  The practical approach to determining source of income, 
predicated on the idea that determining source of income cannot be subject to a 
universal test, has the result of undermining any certainty regarding the source of 
income. Such certainty is fundamental to the South African legal system. Any erosion 
thereof accordingly has negative consequences for the legal system as a whole.  
 
The importance of legal certainty was also recognised by Adam Smith in 1776 when 
he included it as one of his four canons of taxation. Smith argued that, in order to 
achieve justice and utility, a system of taxation must follow four maxims: equity, 
certainty, convenience of payment and economy of collection.222 Regarding certainty, 
Smith remarked, “[t]he time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be 
paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.”223 
Uncertainty in a system of taxation fosters, according to Smith, “insolence” and 
“corruption.”224 Overall, Smith concluded that  
 
“[t]he certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so 
great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequity, it appears, I believe, 
from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree 
of uncertainty.”225 
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4.4.4. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
The cumulative effect of subverting judicial precedent, the prospective operation of 
the law and legal certainty is to whittle away the principle rule of law. The rule of law 
is a foundational value of our democracy and is enshrined in section 1(c) of the 
Constitution.226 One of the core components of the rule of law is the principle of 
legality.227 This requires that: “that the law must be general in nature; that it must be 
prospective and not retrospective; that it must be clear, open and relatively stable” 
(emphasis added).228 In other words, to the extent that the source of income enquiry 
allows for the legal position to be uncertain until judicial pronouncement, it creates an 
environment that is contrary to the principle of legality, the rule of law and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional.  
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 3, the practical person principle was considered as a tool that may be used 
to overcome certain problems that are inherent to the source of income enquiry. From 
this, certain characteristics of the principle and its operation became evident. In 
particular, it is clear that the principle provides an anthropomorphised standard for the 
determination of source of income.  
 
The first part of Chapter 4, therefore, set out to critically analyse this standard. This 
involved a discussion of two key problems that arise out of personifying the approach 
to determining source of income. The first of these problems is that there cannot be a 
comprehensive description of the characteristics of the personified standard. This is 
because any attempt to homologise the differences inherent to a heterogeneous society 
would fail to account for important cultural differences as well as South Africa’s 
constitutional commitment to recognise and rectify the effects of institutionalised 
discrimination. The second problem with a personified standard is that analytically 
separate enquiries are conflated. Specifically the distinction between a subjective 
(fact-based approach) and an objective (norms-based approach) is lost. The result of 
this is that judges are not given guidance in mediating these tensions and this leads to 
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a “whipsaw” between the two. There is evidence of this occurring in the Lever 
Brothers case with Watermeyer CJ and Schreiner JA adopting a norms-based 
approach while Davis AJA adopted a fact-based approach. 
 
These problems arise out of the anthropomorphisation of the approach to determining 
source of income and are, therefore, capable of being overcome by re-describing the 
principle. They are, accordingly, problems with the approach to determining source of 
income in practice and not in principle. By looking at the underlying operation of the 
practical person principle, a mechanism for restraining the overzealous application of 
legal rules, it is possible to overcome the problems discussed above. This involves re-
casting the principle as a method of reflecting and restraining the law.  
 
The second part of Chapter 4 addresses problems with the source of income enquiry 
in principle. These problems arise out of the fundamental premise that a universal test 
for source of income cannot be developed and, therefore, that a practical, hard matter-
of-fact approach must be taken. The first problem is that a practical approach to 
determining source of income in incapable of dealing with complex legal issues. In 
particular, it is recognised that the dichotomy between abstract legal rules and 
concrete practical approaches cannot be overcome without diluting the concept of 
practicality to such a degree that it can no longer perform the function for which it 
was originally introduced. 
 
The second problem with the conception of source of income as a practical question is 
that it provides an unduly flexible criterion for judicial decision-making. This 
flexibility allows the principle to be consciously co-opted by judges as a tool to 
support their own conclusions in a matter. In this way, cases may be decided 
according to the personal desires of judges, be they benevolent or malevolent. This 
will have the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the judiciary. Over and above 
this, the flexibility of the practical approach also lends itself to subconscious 
manipulation. Through the operation of a number of biases implicit in all people, 
judges may find their objectivity in a matter eroded. It is difficult, furthermore, for 
judges to become aware of these biases as a method of achieving greater objectivity, 
as the blind spot bias makes us less likely to recognise our own biases than those of 
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others. The cumulative effect of being biased and unaware of it provides fertile 
ground for the misuse of the practical approach to determining source of income. 
 
These two problems with the approach to determining source of income in principle 
give rise to a number of down-stream negative effects. The first of these is that 
judicial precedent is eroded in favour of a kind of “factual-precedence.” While it is 
argued that a softening of the principle of judicial precedent is not necessarily 
problematic, it is argued that the unreasoned, blanket abolition of the doctrine is 
unwarranted. The second down-stream effect is that the practical approach allows for 
a retrospective application of the law. This is because the flexibility of the approach 
prevents people from knowing the legal position of a particular situation in advance 
and, therefore, from being able to arrange their business transactions in accordance 
with the law. This has the further effect of undermining the principle that people are 
presumed to have knowledge of the law. The third down-stream effect is that legal 
certainty is undermined. This is because judges are given too much scope to deal with 
cases individually and with too much freedom. The cumulative effect of all of this is 
that the principle of the rule of law, a foundational value of South Africa’s 
Constitution, is undermined. The current approach to determining source of income 
is, therefore, unconstitutional. 
 
Given the conclusions reached above, it can be argued further that the practical 
approach to determining source of income, paradoxically, undermines a key aspect of 
its operation. In Section 3.4.6 it is argued that one of the characteristics of the 
operation of the practical person is to facilitate bringing the law in line with public 
perceptions of it. The flexibility associated with the practical approach to determining 
source of income, however, means that such an outcome is by no means certain. To 
the extent that judges may manipulate the source of income enquiry – either to suit 
their own ends or as subjects of ingrained cultural and biological biases – the result 
will not necessarily be a greater harmonisation of the law and public morality. Instead 
the reverse would seem to be more likely.  
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CHAPTER 5: SUGGESTED SOLUTION 
  
No question arises in this case as to the validity of taxation 
measures which have some degree of extra-territorial 
operation; we are concerned solely with the application of a 
statute, properly construed; to facts, properly analysed and 
assessed. 
– Schreiner JA, Lever Brothers 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
The practical approach to determining source of income was predicated on the notion 
that a definitive test would operate too rigidly and give rise to unjust results. The 
Nathan case, therefore, set out to “emphasize [sic] the factual nature of the inquiry 
and that the touchstone [is] practical reality.”229 The effect of this maxim was to 
construct the source of income inquiry as a practical question with the requisite 
flexibility to avoid the creation of a definitive test. This flexibility, as evident from the 
previous discussion, proved to be a “double-edged sword” simultaneously 
overcoming the problems outlined in Chapter 3 and creating the deeper problems 
considered in Chapter 4. 
 
This chapter will examine the possibility of an alternative approach to determining 
source of income. It will be argued that an approach to determining source of income 
that is predicated on philosophical analysis rather than practical convenience will give 
rise to a more desirable solution. In this regard, the statutory interpretative basis of the 
practical person will first be examined. Following this, a brief examination of the 
relative merits of practical or common sense approaches versus legal-philosophical 
approaches will be undertaken. From this it will be argued that a philosophical 
approach provides a more robust mechanism for such enquiries. This will then be 
used as the foundation to an alternative approach for the determination of source of 
income. The approach taken in the case of Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v 
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CIR (Kergeulen)230 will be used as the basis for a superior method for determining 
source of income. Finally, this method will be applied to the facts of Lever Brothers 
in order to illustrate its effectiveness. 
  
5.2. THE LEGISLATIVE BASIS OF THE PRACTICAL APPROACH 
It has been noted in Sections 2.4 and 3.2.1 that the practical approach to determining 
source of income arose out of a literalist/intentionalist interpretation of the income tax 
legislation. The legislature’s failure to provide a definition for source of income led 
judges, operating under this school of interpretation, to the conclusion that source of 
income should not be subject to a strict definition. Consequently, the Nathan maxim, 
which requires source of income to be determined practically and factually, was a 
necessary aspect of the source of income enquiry as authoritatively directed by the 
legislature. Finding source of income was, therefore, a practical question, not because 
judges decided this to be the case, but rather because it had been envisioned as such 
by the legislature.  
 
Under a supreme Constitution, parliament is no longer sovereign.231 This change 
opened the door to new theories of statutory interpretation, including the purposive 
approach. This approach prioritises interpretations of legislation that enhance its goals 
rather than those that arise strictly out of its phraseology. It is now possible, therefore, 
to depart from the wording of legislation where this would better achieve the purpose 
for which the legislation was enacted.  
 
In the present case, the notion that determining source of income is a question that 
should be approached practically is one that may, therefore, be disregarded if this 
would better achieve the legislative purpose. Seen in this light, it may be possible to 
extricate the source of income enquiry from its bonds to the practical approach. The 
relative merits of practicality and philosophical analysis will now be examined against 
their ability to better achieve the legislative purpose. The key argument in this regard 
is that one of the key purposes of all legislation is that it provides an explicit 
codification of the legal position in order to minimise misunderstandings and promote 
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legal certainty.232 The analysis of the practical approach to determining source of 
income undertaken in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 shows that such an approach hinders the 
attainment of legal certainty and is, therefore, in conflict with the overall purpose of 
income tax legislation. Any approach that promotes legal certainty would, 
accordingly, be preferred. 
 
5.3. PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
In Chapter 4 it was shown that a practical approach to questions of source of income 
gives rise to a number of negative consequences for the legal system as a whole. Both 
Russell 233  and Chesterton, 234  however, argue for the merits of a philosophical 
approach to solving complex social problems. This is in distinct conflict with the 
remarks of Davis AJA in Lever Brothers who appears to be sceptical of the value of 
philosophical reasoning. His conclusion in this regard was that the “legal theorist… 
by resolutely shutting his eyes to all the facts, could prove that black was white.”235 In 
line with this, Russell notes that it is common to “doubt whether philosophy is 
anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and 
controversies.”236 This section will argue that philosophical thinking has two key 
advantages over practical, or common sense, approaches: first, that it that it has the 
capacity to yield definitive answers where a practical approach cannot; and, second, it 
provides room for a thorough investigation, which is a good in and of itself. 
 
In the first instance, philosophy provides a platform for the examination of complex 
social, political, economic and legal questions. In this regard, Chesterton argues that 
the concern some people have that philosophy is “a tangle of complicated notions” 
misses the point. It is not philosophy that is complicated; instead it is the “modern 
situation” that is complicated.237 Chesterton argues further that the current situation 
has resulted from a lack of philosophical investigation and instead we need 
philosophy to simplify the world.238  
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The major strength of philosophical reasoning is that it is driven exclusively by the 
pursuit of knowledge. In order to achieve this, the philosophical enquiry is 
characterised by an approach that is impersonal, abstract and universal. This is 
because, without these attributes, any conclusions reached will be confined by “the 
trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices.”239 Russell argues further 
that 
 
[t]he man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the 
prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his 
nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-
operation or consent of his deliberate reason.240  
 
The philosophical process of reasoning through thorough investigation and 
contemplation of a matter is, accordingly, an effective way of guarding against the 
invasion of common sense. It is argued that, only by undertaking a philosophical 
evaluation of a matter can steps be taken in the direction of an ultimate truth. 
Practicality on the other hand, argues Chesterton, may take progressive steps toward 
this; however, it is too focused on efficiency and the natural evolution of things to 
achieve meaningful knowledge. He argues further that “the practical man cannot be 
expected to improve the impracticable muddle” in which we find ourselves.241  
 
The second great benefit of philosophy is that, even if it cannot provide a definitive 
answer on a subject, it has a positive effect on the “student” of philosophy. In this 
regard, Russell argues that the study of philosophy provides a good for the mind, 
which is just as important as goods for the body.242 This is because, according to 
Russell, 
 
however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of 
philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their 
importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative 
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interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely 
ascertainable knowledge.243 
 
Importantly, it is in attempting to answer questions that may ultimately be 
unanswerable that philosophy presents its greatest advantage: being confronted with 
uncertainty and doubt frees the mind of the philosopher to the vast array of 
potentialities and, “because these questions enlarge our conception of what is 
possible, [it will] enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic 
assurance which closes the mind against speculation.”244 
 
It is due to the combination of these two results of philosophical thinking that it is 
argued that a philosophical approach would be better suited to the problem of finding 
source of income. In the first instance it is argued that philosophical thinking, through 
its emphasis on independent critical analysis, provides a powerful framework with 
which to address the question of source of income. Through such an approach it may 
be possible to find a definitive test for determining source of income where an 
approach predicated on practicality has failed. In the second instance, and if, after a 
rigorous philosophical evaluation, such a test proves to be impossible; it is argued that 
the process of coming to such a conclusion would have greatly enhanced the mind of 
the thinker. A judge who is tasked with such an examination would be confronted 
with a vast array of possibilities and, in confronting these, would likely be humbled 
by the process and hopefully left in wonder at the intricacies of the society that has 
been created around us. A mind that has been opened by such an experience would 
be, it is argued, better equipped to tackle future quandaries as they arise. It would also 
be less likely to be “imprisoned by common sense.”245 
 
The sentiment behind this conclusion is, accordingly, succinctly stated in the 
following passage by Crane: 
 
[the practical person] is supposed to be of much more real use to the world than the 
Theoretical Man. We speak of the man who ‘does things’ or ‘gets things done’ with a 
certain smack and relish as though he, after all, were the fellow worth while. 
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Practical implies that he can do things that he has practised. But when he wants a 
thing done that nobody practised, when he gets one of the real hard knots of life, your 
practical man is helpless. Then we discover that the great man is the Dreamer with a 
head full of theories. 
 
The best work is done by the Theorists, in their laboratories, watching test-tubes, in 
their studies excogitating philosophies, or under the summer trees dreaming of the 
coming days of gold and singing of their dreams.246 
 
Determining source of income, it has been argued throughout, is one of those “hard 
knots of life” and, therefore, ought to be approached by the philosopher.  
 
5.4. THE KERGEULEN APPROACH 
If a philosophical approach to determining source of income is adopted, it may be 
possible, as indicated in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, to design a test for the determination of 
source of income. Such a test would be capable of providing definitive answers to 
source of income questions and would, therefore, have the effect of avoiding the 
flexibility associated with the traditional practical approach. This section will argue 
that the approach to determining source of income that was adopted in the Kergeulen 
case provides a useful framework for the construction of such a test. In order to 
illustrate the scope and application of the Kergeulen approach, the facts of the case 
will first be set out. The approach taken in Kergeulen will then be outlined. Finally, 
this approach will be applied to the facts in Lever Brothers in order to illustrate its 
effectiveness. 
 
5.4.1. FACTS IN KERGEULEN 
The Kergeulen case arose out of disputed tax assessments for the 1935 and 1936 tax 
years.247 During this time, the Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd (the Kergeulen 
Company) was in the business of producing and selling whale oil. Its base of 
operations was aboard a “factory ship that was stationed outside of the territorial 
waters of the Union [of South Africa].”248 It also operated a fleet of smaller whale 
catching ships, which would trawl the Antarctic seas, harpoon whales and tow them 
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back to the factory ship where “the oil would be extracted from their carcases.”249 The 
Kergeulen Company was registered, along with its fleet of ships, in Cape Town where 
it also had its head office and board of directors.250 One of the principal purchasers of 
this oil was Unilever Ltd in London. The Kergeulen Company took issue with the tax 
assessments on the basis that the income that it had earned was not from a source 
within the Union of South Africa.251  
 
5.4.2. THE KERGEULEN TEST 
There were several issues for the Appellate Division to decide in the Kergeulen case 
and the verdict turned largely on matters of the law of contract, which are outside the 
scope of the present enquiry. What is relevant for the present purposes, however, are 
the court’s obiter remarks regarding “the important and crucial question whether these 
ships are to be regarded as part of the territory of the Union for the purpose of 
applying the provisions of the Income Tax Act.”252  
 
As a preface to Stratford CJ’s approach to the question of source of income in 
Kergeulen, it is evident that the tone of the judgment was at all times principled, 
logical and legalistic. Stratford CJ also credited the masterful enunciation of Roman 
Dutch law by the Judge-President in the court of first instance in the Kergeulen 
matter, and recognised the importance of careful consideration and deliberation in 
judicial decision-making.253 It is on this backdrop that Stratford CJ set out that judges 
“should at all times be logical in [their] reasoning, and as philosophic and systematic 
as [they] can in [their] laying down of legal principles.”254 Although these sentiments 
are noted in preface to a recognition of the importance of serving the best practical 
purpose in such undertakings, Stratford CJ made it clear that such questions of 
practical convenience are secondary to the question of legal theory.255 In this regard, 
Stratford CJ held that the first question is one of theory, as may be expounded by 
eminent jurists, and, should an election between equally supported theories be 
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required, the second question would be to decide the matter on the basis of practical 
convenience.  
 
This sentiment is in line with the principled approach to determining source of income 
in Kergeulen. Stratford CJ’s judgment was founded on “the equitable principles 
generally found to underlie liability for income tax.”256 Critically it was held that, in 
order for a levy to be equitable, either the taxpayer must be a resident of that country 
(this echoes the residency based system of taxation which South Africa later adopted), 
or the country in question must have facilitated the production of wealth in some 
way.257 This may be, for example, by providing some sort of infrastructure for the 
production of the income in question, such as security, transport systems, natural 
resources or other state provisions. Overall, therefore, the equity principle requires 
that, where the production of wealth is enabled by the state, that wealth is capable of 
being taxed. The equity principle, it is contended, can be seen as a “rights based 
approach” to taxation; it is a recognition of the state’s right, in certain circumstances, 
to a share in the wealth that it has enabled in order to continue to enable the 
production of future wealth. 
 
Working in parallel to the equity principle, according to Stratford CJ, is the “effective 
means principle.”258 This principle requires not only that the state must have the right 
to tax certain income, but it must also be capable of enforcing that levy.259 In this 
regard, Stratford CJ held that the income tax legislation was not intended to create 
empty threats (brutum fulmen) and that the act “clearly implies an ability to make the 
deduction.” In sum, the state must be able to collect the tax. 
 
The Kergeulen approach can, therefore, be seen as a two-legged enquiry based on 
equity and effectiveness. Income is, therefore, from a source within South Africa if it 
is equitable – based on the provision of state resources – and effective – based on the 
state’s ability to collect the tax. 
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In the Kergeulen case, the court relied heavily on the fact that the ships were 
operating outside of the territorial waters of the Union. The ships were, therefore, not 
making use of any resources held by the Union. Furthermore, it would be 
“ridiculous,”260 according to Stratford CJ, to attempt to levy a tax on ships operating 
in the Antarctic. A tax on the income in question would, therefore, be neither 
equitable nor effective. The income in question was accordingly not from a source 
within the Union.  
 
In conclusion, the approach taken in the Kergeulen case clearly provides a useful test 
for the determination of source of income. It does this by reducing the question of 
source of income to two underlying legal principles: that such a tax must be equitable 
and effective. From these, it is argued, a body of law can be developed that will, over 
time, clarify and refine their meaning. In this way, as with rights-based law in general, 
judicial precedent operates to give greater content to the right in question 
incrementally.  
 
5.4.3. APPLICATION OF THE KERGEULEN APPROACH TO THE FACTS 
OF LEVER BROTHERS 
The Kergeulen case was decided in 1939, just one year before the first tax assessment 
that was disputed in the Lever Brothers case. As such, the test developed in Kergeulen 
was clearly available to the judges in Lever Brothers. Furthermore, Watermeyer CJ 
presided over both cases and, having concurred in the Kergeulen judgment, would 
have been aware of the ambit of its application.261 It is interesting, however, that 
Schreiner JA in Lever Brothers specifically noted that 
 
[n]o question arises in this case as to the validity of taxation measures which have 
some degree of extra-territorial operation; we are concerned solely with the 
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application of a statute, properly construed; to facts, properly analysed and 
assessed.262 
 
In this statement, Schreiner JA makes it clear that the underlying legal-philosophical 
basis of source of income was not questioned in the Lever Brothers case. It is argued, 
however, that since such an analysis had already been conducted by the court in 
Kergeulen, it would have been opportune for the court in Lever Brothers to assess the 
facts on that basis. The question of the validity of such taxation measures, therefore, 
need not have been a question. Nevertheless, the court in Lever Brothers took a 
markedly different approach to determining source of income from that in Kergeulen. 
This difference will be illustrated below by applying the facts in Lever Brothers to the 
Kergeulen test. 
 
The first leg of the test is to look at the equity of the tax in question. In the Lever 
Brothers case, a prominent feature of the transaction entered into between Mavibel 
and Overseas Holdings is that it was undertaken, as inferred by the judges, in 
contemplation of war in Europe. Moving the assets to South Africa can, therefore, be 
seen as an attempt to make use of the financial protection South Africa offered. This 
may suggest that, by provisioning its corporate structures and security, South Africa 
had enabled the production of wealth and, therefore, ought to be entitled to tax that 
wealth. There are, however, further factors that may be weighed against this 
conclusion: the fact that the cession of the original agreement to South Africa was 
merely incidental to its intended operation – that being to extend credit to a Dutch 
company; that the interest was paid entirely out of an American company; that an 
agreement was entered into on the basis that no funds would leave the country and 
that no income producing activities were carried on in South Africa.  
 
Under the rights based system of taxation, the court would simply be required to 
balance these competing factors in order to ascertain whether or not the income was 
enabled by South Africa. On these facts, it would seem that the move to South Africa 
was clearly incidental to the original credit agreement. While the protection offered 
by South Africa enabled the contract to proceed without undue difficulty, it did not 
enable the underlying contract – the substance of which is paramount. Clearly, 
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therefore, the fact that Overseas Holdings did not carry out income-producing 
activities, or produce any wealth, in South Africa would be of great importance. 
Consequently, it would seem that under the equity principle South Africa would not 
be entitled to tax the income in question. 
 
Regarding the second leg of the test, Overseas Holdings paid the interest to Levers out 
of dividend income earned on the shares held in trust by the Whitehall Trust Ltd in 
England. The assessments raised by the Commissioner were against Levers, which 
was not a South African resident. It would, therefore, be clear that the Commissioner 
would not be able to control the interest paid to Levers since these amounts did not go 
through South Africa. Overseas Holdings as a South African resident company would, 
however, be liable for tax assessments in South Africa but would have had no income 
out of which the tax could be paid and no access to capital to do so. Accordingly, 
under the principle of effectiveness, the Commissioner would likely not be able to tax 
the income in question.  
 
An application of the Kergeulen test clearly does not remove all doubt from the 
question of source of income in the Lever Brothers case. It is plausible that, had the 
judges approached the facts on this basis, there would nevertheless have been a split 
decision. The key distinction between an approach based on practicality and one 
based on the principles of the Kergeulen test is that the latter approach promotes the 
development of a comprehensive and definitive understanding of when income will 
be subject to taxation in South Africa while the former does not. It is through the 
rigorous examination of a principled approach that succeeding cases can refine our 
understanding of these issues. Over time, through the application of judicial 
precedent, legal certainty in these matters can be enhanced. It is for this reason that a 
philosophical approach to determining source of income is argued for; it will not 
make the so-called “hard cases” any less challenging to judges, but it will promote a 
systemic approach to law that, through constant examination and revision, will 
achieve a greater understanding of source of income than a flexible approach 
predicated on common sense and practical convenience.  
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
The practical approach to determining source of income arose out of a 
literalist/intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation. Accordingly, source of 
income was held to be practical question not out of convenience but as a result of the 
intention of the legislature. With the advent of constitutionalism, however, new 
theories of statutory interpretation have found favour. One of the more prominent of 
these is the purposive approach, which, for the present purposes, allows the source of 
income enquiry to be disentangled from practicality, if this would better serve the 
legislative purpose.  
 
It was then shown that a philosophical approach to probing complex social issues has 
two distinct advantages over practical approaches. In the first case, by approaching 
problems systematically and analytically, the philosophical approach makes it 
possible to find a definitive test for source of income. In the second case, even if no 
such test is possible, the philosophical approach is a humbling endeavour; that better 
equips the judicial decision-maker to the task of judging than mere deference to 
“common sense.” 
 
On the basis that a philosophical method is preferred, it was then argued that the 
principled approach taken in the Kergeulen case creates a two-legged test that can 
provide definitive answers to source of income questions. What the Kergeulen case 
did was to break down the source of income enquiry into its two constituent 
principles: that taxation must be equitable and that it must be effective. By applying 
this test to the facts of Lever Brothers it became clear that such an approach would 
not make questions of source of income easy. Instead, what it does achieve is the 
creation of a mechanism that works in harmony with judicial precedent to continually 
refine the meaning of source of income with the contributions of successive 
judgments. This approach, therefore, has the capacity to achieve greater legal 
certainty over time where approaches predicated on practicality or common sense 
cannot.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Lord Bacon reminds us that the thoughts of the philosophers 
may be likened to the stars, they are lofty, but give very little 
light. 
– Stratford CJ, Kergeulen 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research was to critically analyse the practical person principle with 
particular emphasis on its application in the Lever Brothers case. In the process of 
achieving this goal, a number of sub-goals were set out; these included evaluating the 
extent to which the practical person principle requires judges to adopt a criterion that 
is too flexible for legitimate judicial decision-making; assessing whether the practical 
person principle promotes legal certainty, the principle of judicial precedent and the 
rule of law; debating the extent to which the practical person principle creates a clash 
between a philosophical approach to law and an approach that is based on common 
sense or practicality; and considering whether adopting a philosophical approach to 
determining the source of income can overcome the problems associated with the 
practical approach.  
 
This chapter will summarise the conclusions drawn in Chapters 2 to 5 with particular 
emphasis on highlighting how these contributed to achieving the research objectives. 
Throughout this process it will be necessary to highlight certain topics that were 
considered to be beyond the scope of this research and, therefore, were afforded 
limited treatment. In some cases these limitations present opportunities for interesting 
and useful research in the future; these will be discussed briefly where appropriate. 
The final section of this chapter will be a short discussion of the value of the present 
research as a metaphor for the treatment of future legal quandaries. 
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6.2. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The practical person principle was brought into South African law in the Lever 
Brothers case. It was, therefore, necessary to undertake a thorough evaluation of this 
case in order to lay the groundwork for the critical analysis that followed. This 
evaluation was conducted in Chapter 2 and involved contextualising the judgment as 
well as a discussion of each of the individual judge’s judgments. From this, two broad 
features of the judgment appeared. First, that the complex and unusual transactions 
that gave rise to the case provided fertile ground for a final delineation of the nature 
of source of income. This led to the creation of the two-step framework, as well as the 
adoption of the practical person principle, and the Lever Brothers case became the 
ultimate authority for determining source of income until legislative amendments took 
place in 1998. The second broad feature of the judgment was that certain tensions 
between the three judgments were revealed. In particular, these tensions were shown 
to have arisen out of three different interpretations of the practical person principle 
and resulted in manifestly different approaches to the case. This divergence provided 
a foundation for the evaluation of practical person principle as a criterion for 
determining the source of income.  
 
The object of Chapter 3 was, accordingly, to evaluate the practical person principle in 
greater detail. The approach taken in this regard was to first assess the purpose for 
which the principle was introduced as a means to providing a comprehensive 
description of how the principle operates. This involved tracing the history of the 
principle to its inception in the Nathan case. A brief comparative analysis of the use 
of this principle in other jurisdictions, particularly in Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Australia, was also undertaken. Given that the primary purpose of this thesis was to 
critically evaluate the application of the practical person principle as it arose in the 
Lever Brothers case, it was beyond the present scope to conduct a thorough 
investigation into the nuances of how this principle developed in different 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, from the analysis conducted, it appeared that the practical 
person principle was introduced, in all the jurisdictions studied, to overcome certain 
problems that were considered inherent to the source of income inquiry. Specifically, 
that it was considered impossible to develop a definitive test for determining source of 
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income. This problem manifested in a further guise in that an ultimate hierarchy of 
factors for determining source of income could not be established.  
 
The solution to these problems was the adoption of a flexible tool that would facilitate 
a practical approach to the particular facts of each case in order to avert the 
possibility of unjust results. This tool was created in the form of the practical person 
principle. Given the role that the practical person principle was crafted to fulfil, it 
became possible to elucidate a number of “characteristics” of this hypothetical person. 
In particular, the practical person principle provides a flexible criterion that facilitates 
giving precedence to the substance of a matter over its form; disregarding technical 
legal rules; aligns the law with public perceptions; and provides a practical – rather 
than philosophical – approach to judicial decision-making. This analysis formed the 
necessary first step toward the achieving the goal of critically analysing the principle. 
 
The critical analysis of the practical person principle was undertaken in Chapter 4. 
Principally, this involved a critique that was carried out on two levels. The first level 
of analysis focused on problems with the “practical person” in practice while the 
second level addressed deeper problems with such an approach in principle. The 
problems in practice can be described as problems that arise out of the particular way 
that the practical person principle was used in the Lever Brothers case. Specifically, 
that such an approach relies on an anthropomorphisation of underlying aspects of the 
source of income enquiry. By personifying the approach to determining source of 
income two problems arise. First, that it is impossible to provide an adequate 
description of the standard that is implied by such a personification, since to do so 
would fail to recognise the differences implicit in a heterogeneous society. Second, 
that the anthropomorphised approach combines analytically separate enquiries with 
the result that judges are left without adequate guidance when determining source of 
income. Consequentially, the true operation of the practical person principle is lost.  
 
The first significant finding of Chapter 4 was, accordingly, that the practical person 
principle – as an anthropomorphisation of underlying aspects of the source of income 
enquiry – is a problematic tool for determining source of income. Since such 
problems arise out of the particular incantation of this principle, however, these 
problems can be removed by describing the principle differently. Looking at the true 
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operation of the principle, as a tool to restrain the overzealous application of the law, 
it is argued that the personification can be removed without negating the underlying 
operation of the principle.  
 
The reasoning undertaken to overcome these problems with the practical person 
principle involved a comparison with the concept of the reasonable person from 
criminal law. A number of similarities between these principles were shown; 
however, it was beyond the scope of the present enquiry to undertake a 
comprehensive comparison. If further research shows that it would be inappropriate to 
generalise conclusions drawn in respect of the reasonable person to the practical 
person principle, some of the conclusions in this research may have to be revised.  
 
The second level of analysis focused on the operation of a practical approach to 
determining source of income in principle. The problems associated with a practical 
approach are, therefore, independent of the guise that is given to the principle. This 
investigation involved describing two criticisms of the underlying operation of the 
practical person principle. The first is that a practical approach to determining source 
of income is unsuited to dealing with complex legal issues. In this regard it is argued 
that a number of aspects of the South African legal system are created through the 
operation of legal fiction or metaphor. These aspects are, therefore, unsuited to 
practical evaluation and if such an approach is taken the effect is to dilute the concept 
of practicality to such a degree that it can no longer perform the function for which it 
was introduced. The second critique of the practical approach is that it provides an 
unduly flexible criterion for judicial decision-making. In this regard, the flexibility 
required to overcome the problems inherent to the source of income enquiry proves to 
be a “double-edged sword” in that it leaves the approach open to judicial 
manipulation.  
 
The notion that judges may use the flexibility afforded to them with negative results 
has not been subject to much research in South Africa. In this regard, there is 
considerable scope for future research, particularly quantitative research into the 
extent to which judges can be seen as independent, objective adjudicators. The 
research cited suggests that judges may not be as objective as the legal system is 
designed to accommodate. If future research shows, however, that judges are capable 
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of achieving a high level of objectivity – and in doing so overcoming their 
subconscious biases – then many of the conclusions of this paper may no longer be 
valid. In such a case, the present critique of the practical approach to determining 
source of income will probably not hold to the extent argued presently.   
 
The flexibility inherent to the practical approach to determining source of income is 
principally responsible for a number of negative down-stream consequences. This 
analysis formed the crux of this research and involved an evaluation of many of the 
sub-goals. First, that the doctrine of judicial precedent is eroded to such a degree that 
judges are given carte blanche with the particular facts. Second, that – by requiring 
matters be determined on a case-by-case basis along with the flexibility and 
uncertainty associated with the practical approach to determining source of income – 
there is no way for people to be able to bring their actions in line with the law before 
judicial pronouncement. The effect of this is to undermine the principle that the law 
should be applied prospectively as well as the presumption that everyone has 
knowledge of the law. Third, the cumulative effect of the above is legal certainty is 
compromised. Finally, since the rule of law – a founding value of the South African 
Constitution – requires that the law must be general in nature, prospective, clear and 
stable, the effect of the practical approach to source of income is to undermine the 
rule of law and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Paradoxically, this may also mean 
undermining one of the very characteristics of the operation of the practical person 
principle, that being to facilitate bringing the law in line with public perceptions of it. 
 
From this analysis, the second significant finding of Chapter 4 could be drawn. This 
was that the practical approach to determining source of income results in a number 
of negative down-stream consequences, the effect of which is a situation that is not 
only undesirable but also unconstitutional.  
 
Having shown the negative consequences of a practical approach to determining 
source of income, Chapter 5 set out to evaluate the relative merits of a philosophical 
approach to considering complex questions. It is in Chapter 5, therefore, that the 
reaming sub-goals were addressed. Regarding the first sub-goal, it was argued that a 
philosophical approach to probing complex social issues has two distinct advantages 
over practical approaches. First, a philosophical approach makes it possible to come 
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to definitive conclusions whereas a practical approach can only stumble upon such an 
outcome. Second, that even if no such conclusion is possible, the philosophical 
approach is a humbling endeavour that better serves the judicial decision-maker than 
mere deference to “common sense.” 
 
Regarding the second sub-goal, having shown that a philosophical method is 
preferred, it was then argued that the principled approach taken in the Kergeulen case 
could provide definitive answers to questions of source of income. This approach was 
then applied to the facts of Lever Brothers where it was shown that such an approach 
provides a mechanism that overcomes the problems associated with the practical 
approach to determining source of income. It is, therefore, concluded that a 
philosophical approach to determining source of income has the capacity to provide a 
definitive test under which greater legal certainty can be achieved over time.  
 
The discussion regarding the conflict between practical and philosophical approaches 
to difficult subjects is a vast and complex area of research, which for the present 
purposes had to be severely limited. As with many things the answer will rarely fall 
squarely on one side or the other, instead – as Stratford CJ reminds us in Kergeulen – 
a delicate balance must be struck between “theoretical enquiry” and the “balance of 
practical convenience.”263 In the present case it is argued that the practical approach 
to determining source of income does not strike this balance appropriately; it is, 
therefore, argued that a philosophical enquiry would be preferred. Achieving a 
desirable balance is, however, an intricate and involved question that future research 
may be able to deduce. 
 
6.3. THE PRESENT RESEARCH AS A METAPHOR 
Legislative amendments changing South Africa’s system of taxation from a source-
based system to one based on residence, as well as the codification of the source of 
certain categories of income, have greatly limited the number of cases that will 
require an evaluation of the Lever Brothers precedent. The practical person principle 
is, therefore, largely a relic of the past. The key purpose of this thesis is, therefore, not 
to facilitate the achievement of an ultimate test for the determination of the source of 
                                                
263 Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v CIR 1939 AD 487 504. 
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income, but rather its value is as a metaphor for the approach to legal thinking more 
generally. By illustrating the flaws of a solely practical approach to judicial decision-
making, this paper argues for a more rigorous philosophical approach to the law.  
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